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Abstract
The paper examines the process of banking sector reforms in India. It notes the beneficial impact
to the financial system consequent upon the reforms and highlights the current weaknesses in the banking
system. Against this background, the paper identifies the emerging challenges and discusses ways in
which they could be tackled.
In order to evaluate the efficacy of the prudential norms, we conduct a stress test of credit risk.
Our analysis reveals that, depending on the percentage of loans that graduate into non-performance and
the provisioning made, the immediate hit is a loss of interest income between Rs.21-55 billion. The
maximum level of additional provisioning that can support the present capital adequacy ratio is
determined.
The paper has benefited with comments from Dr.Y.V.Reddy, Prof. Anne O. Krueger, Mr. Ashok V.Desai,
Dr. Ajay Shah and Mr. Sajjid Chinoy on an earlier draft. The views expressed in the paper are entirely
personal and do not, in any way, reflect those of the institutions to which the authors' belong.
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3One of the major areas of the economy that has received renewed focus in recent times
has been the financial sector. And within the broad ambit of the financial sector, it is the banking
sector that has been the cynosure of academia and policymakers alike. With concerns about
financial stability emerging to the forefront of policy challenges facing central banks worldwide,
it is being increasingly realized that promoting healthy financial institutions, especially banks, is
a crucial prerequisite towards this end. Not surprisingly therefore, the banking sector in most
emerging economies is passing through challenging yet exciting times and India is no exception
to this rule.
In the light of the importance of financial intermediation and the difficulties that several countries
have encountered in restructuring their fragile banking systems, it would be useful to examine the
performance of the banking sector in India during the nineties. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.
Section I provides an overview of the situation in the pre-reform period. Section II examines the impact of
the reforms process. The weaknesses in the banking system are discussed in Section III. This is followed
by a discussion of the emerging challenges in the Indian banking system in Section IV. The concluding
remarks are gathered in Section V. Needless to say, banking sector is a crucial link in the reform process,
but not the only one. Supporting reforms in the rest of the financial sector, real sector, including
agriculture, trade and industrial policies along with macroeconomic control and supportive fiscal and
external sector policies are as much important for successful reforms, as reforms in the financial sector
themselves (Rangarajan, 1994). These are beyond the scope of the present paper are therefore sidestepped
for the present.
I. Banking and Finance in the Pre-Reform Period
At independence, saving and investment in India were low and only two-thirds of the economy
was monetised. For example, net domestic saving as percent of Net Domestic Product (NDP) at market
prices was only 9.3 per cent in 1960-61, which rose to 11.8 per cent in 1969-70 (Reserve Bank of India,
1978). With limited foreign saving and the negligible contribution of the public and private corporate
sectors, the burden of saving mobilisation fell on the household sector. The bulk of the saving of
household sector was in the form of financial assets, and bank deposits dominated the financial asset
portfolio of households (Table 1).
By the fifties, the banking system was concentrated primarily in the urban and metropolitan
areas.1 The disconcerting findings of the All-India Debt and Investment Survey in 1954 of the inequitable
1 The banking system in India comprises of commercial and cooperative banks. The former include foreign banks
operating in India, in addition to Indian banks in the public and the private sectors. The public sector banks, in turn,
4distribution of bank credit2, notwithstanding the existence of a branch licensing policy (where the central
bank issued bank licences which emphasized the spread of branches to rural and semi-urban areas) meant
that these features of bank credit were not in consonance with the goal of achieving an equitable
allocation of credit as envisaged in the Five Year Plans. After the establishment of the State Bank of India
(a scheduled commercial bank) in 19553, there were distinct efforts on its part to expand rural branches,
though there was no statutory requirement to this effect.
The bank nationalisation in July 1969 with its objective to ‘control the commanding heights of
the economy and to meet progressively…the needs of development of the economy in conformity with
national policy and objectives’ (Reserve Bank of India, 1983) served to intensify the social objective of
ensuring that financial intermediaries fully met the credit demands for productive purposes. Two
significant aspects of nationalisation were (i) rapid branch expansion and (ii) channelling of credit
according to plan priorities. To meet the broad objectives, banking facilities were made available in
hitherto uncovered areas, so as to enable them to not only mop up potential savings and meet the credit
gaps in agriculture and small-scale industries,4 thereby helping to bring large areas of economic activities
within the organised banking system. Towards this end, the Lead Bank Scheme introduced in December
1969 represented an important step towards implementation of the two-fold objective of mobilisation of
deposits on an extensive scale throughout the country and striving for planned expansion of banking
facilities to bring about greater regional balance5. As a consequence, the perceived need of the borrower
comprises of nationalized banks (the majority holding being with the Government) and the State Bank of India (the
majority holding being with the Reserve Bank of India, the central bank) and its seven associate banks (the majority
holding being with the State Bank of India). Regional Rural Banks are subsidiaries of commercial banks which are
specially set up in the rural areas to provide credit and other facilities to weaker sections for productive activities in
agriculture, industry, trade, etc. The co-operative banks essentially follow the unit banking principle and provide
short-term credit to the rural sector. Among the co-operative banks, while the Land Development Banks fund the
activities related to capital formation in agriculture, urban co-operative banks finance small business in the urban
areas. Additionally, Government-owned post-offices mobilize deposits, but do not undertake any lending activity.
Besides, there is an extensive network of all-India and state-level development financial institutions catering to
agriculture, industry, housing and exports. In addition, there are the investment institutions, catering to both life and
general insurance as well as non-bank financial companies-all engaged in mobilizing resources and providing
financial services as well as undertaking medium and long-term investment.
2 According to the findings of the Committee, out of the total borrowings of farmers in 1951-52, which was
estimated at Rs.750 crore, commercial banks provided only 0.9 per cent, while money lenders provided 70 per cent.
3 The State Bank of India was created by nationalizing the Imperial Bank of India and in 1959, eight major state
associated banks were made its subsidiaries.
4 The definition of a small-scale industry has undergone a transformation over the years. In 1960, a small-scale
industry was defined as one with gross value of fixed assets not exceeding Rs 5 lakh. This figure has been gradually
revised upwards and presently stands at Rs. 0.01 billion.
5 Under the Lead Bank Scheme, individual banks in a given geographical area were entrusted with the responsibility
to locate growth centers, assess deposit potential and identify credit gaps, and in concert with other banks and credit
agencies operating there, evolve a coordinated programme of credit deployment for each district.
5gained primacy over commercial considerations in the banking sector6. In April 1980, six more private
sector banks were nationalised, thus extending the domain of public control over the banking system.
Such control also resulted in several inefficiencies creeping into the banking system. Repression assumed
the form of high and administered interest rate structure with a large measure of built-in cross-
subsidisation (in the form of minimum lending rates for commercial sector), high levels of pre-emptions
of primary and secondary reserve requirements, in the form of cash reserve ratio (CRR) and statutory
liquidity ratio (SLR) (Table 2)7.
As is evident from Table 2, the CRR and SLR, which were initially pegged at 4 per cent and 33
per cent of Net Demand and Time Liabilities (NDTL) were gradually raised over a period of time; at the
onset of the reforms in 1991-92, CRR and SLR taken together pre-empted 63.5 per cent of NDTL. Since
then, pre-emptions have been reduced and SLR presently stands at its statutory minimum of 25 per cent.
Likewise, the structure of administered interest rates has gradually been dismantled. Prescriptions of rates
on term deposits, including conditions of premature withdrawal, have been dispensed with. The only
prescribed rate at present is the 4 percent rate on savings bank account. Likewise, on the lending front, in
the pre-reform period, lending rate structure consisted of six categories based on the size of loans and
under each category, a minimum lending rate was prescribed. Lending rates have since been gradually
deregulated and at present, banks are required to announce the Prime Lending Rate (PLR) and are
allowed a maximum spread (not exceeding 4 per cent) on loans. The Bank Rate, which had for long
remained a dormant policy tool, was activated in 1997 as a signalling rate and the entire spectrum of
interest rates for any refinance or liquidity support from the RBI, have since been linked to the Bank Rate.
Secondly, retail lending to riskier areas of business on the ‘free’ portion of bank’s resources
engendered ‘adverse selection’ of borrowers. With limited prospects of recovery, this raised costs and
affected the quality of bank assets. Quantitative restrictions (branch licensing and restrictions on new
lines of business) and inflexible management structures severely constrained the operational
independence and functional autonomy of banks. The inflationary expectations and the inequitable tax
structures exacerbated the strains on the exchequer, since resources for developmental purposes were not
readily forthcoming. As the quality of asset portfolio of banks rapidly deteriorated, it was evident that the
profitability of the banking system was severely compromised and importantly, rather than acting as a
conduit of intermediation, the banking system was held hostage to the process of economic growth.
6 Bank assets, for instance, comprised 66 per cent of total assets of banks and financial institutions in 1970-71,
which rose to 84 per cent in 1980-81, but declined subsequently thereafter to about 70 per cent during the period
1991-92 to 1994-95.
7 Demetriades and Luintel (1996) have demonstrated that banking sector controls had overwhelmingly negative
effects on financial development in India, both in the short run as well as in the long run. A more recent study by
Demetriades and Luintel (1997), using both static ordinary least squares and dynamic ordinary least squares,
confirms the earlier assertion.
6Thirdly, in addition, the widespread market segmentation and the constraints on competition
exacerbated the already fragile situation. The market for short-term funds was reserved for banks and the
market for long-term funds was the exclusive domain of Development Financial Institutions (DFIs)8.
Direct access of corporate borrowers to lenders (disintermediation) was strictly controlled and non-bank
financial companies (NBFCs) were allowed to collect funds only for corporates.
These adverse developments coupled with the balance-of-payments crisis, which followed in the
wake of the Gulf War of 1990 coupled with the erosion of public savings and the inability of the public
sector to generate resources for investment rapidly brought forth the imperatives for financial sector
strengthening in India. Although these reforms were also provoked by the globalisation trends around the
world almost around the same time (Williamson and Mahar, 1998), there was a distinct Indian flavour in
the pace, sequencing, caution and complementarity. As Reddy (2000) has observed, the Indian approach
to financial sector reforms is based on pancha sutra or five principles-cautious and proper sequencing;
mutually reinforcing measures; complementarity between reforms in banking sector and changes in fiscal,
external and monetary policies; developing financial infrastructure; and developing financial markets.
While this approach is at variance with the 'big-bang' approach pursued in several countries, the gradualist
approach is credited with the advantage of enhancing macro stability, whilst at the same time, fostering
the microeconomic linkages.9 And, the gradualism was the outcome of India’s democratic and highly
pluralistic polity in which reforms could be implemented if based on a popular consensus (Ahluwalia,
1993). More importantly, the favourable experience of liberalisation in the 1980s created an intellectual
climate for continuing in the same direction. While the crisis of 1991 favoured bolder reforms being
ushered, the pace had to be calibrated to what would be acceptable in a democracy. Secondly, structural
adjustment measures were undertaken in simultaneity with liberalisation programme, in order to harness
8 Development Financial Institutions were institutions set up to cater essentially to the medium and long term project
financing requirements of the industrial sector.
9 One reason for gradualism was simply because reforms were not introduced against a background of prolonged
economic crisis or system collapse of the type which would have created a widespread desire for, and willingness to
accept radical restructuring. The reforms were introduced in June 1991 in the wake of a balance-of-payments crisis
which was certainly severe. It was not a prolonged crisis; on the contrary, it erupted suddenly at the end of a period
of healthy growth in the 1980s, when the Indian economy grew at about 5.5 per cent per year, on average. Although
modest by international standards, this was much better than India’s previous experience of 3.5 - 4 per cent growth.
Secondly, by the beginning of the eighties, it began to be recognized that the system of controls, with its heavy
dependence on the public sector and a highly protected inward-oriented industrialization strategy, could not deliver
rapid growth in an increasingly competitive world environment. While several initiatives were undertaken in the
second half of the eighties to mitigate the rigours of the control regime, through lowering of direct tax rates,
expanding the role of the private sector and liberalize of licensing controls on both trade and foreign investment,
these changes were marginal rather than fundamental in nature, amounting more to loosening controls and operating
them more flexibly rather than a comprehensive shift away from a regime of controls. Since the economy was seen
to have responded well to these initiatives, with an acceleration of growth in the eighties, it created a strong
presumption in favour of evolutionary change (Ahluwalia, 1993). Further, as the Appendix shows, reform measures
have been introduced in a gradual fashion over the years.
7the stabilising influence associated with certain measures of liberalisation. Thirdly, macroeconomic
stability was made a concurrent pursuit. Fiscal and external sector policies supported monetary policy in
maintaining overall balance. Prudential regulations were put in place to ensure safety and soundness,
while transparency and accountability in operations were aimed at restoring the credibility of the banking
system. Fourthly, recognising the inter-linkages between the real and financial sectors, wide-ranging
reforms were also undertaken in the real sector so that financial intermediation kept pace with underlying
economic activity.
II. Effects of the Reforms
The recommendations of the Narasimham Committee in 1991 provided the blueprint for the first-
generation reform of the financial system (Jalan, 2000; Reddy, 1999). While these reforms were being
implemented, the world economy also witnessed significant changes, ‘coinciding with the movement
towards global integration of financial services’ (Narasimham Committee, 1998). Against such backdrop,
the Report of the Narasimham Committee II (NCR-II) on Banking Sector Reforms provided the
framework for the current reform process.
The visible impact of reforms is evident in both a widening (as reflected in the financial
interrelations ratio) as well as the deepening (as evidenced by the intermediation ratio) of the
intermediation process and well as its positive influence on growth (as reflected by the finance ratio)
(Table 3). In addition to banks, various other intermediaries, including financial institutions, mutual funds
and non-banking financial companies, are also engaged in the process of intermediation.
Second, the statutory pre-emptions have gradually been lowered. The combined pre-emptions
under CRR and SLR, amounting to 63.5 per cent of net demand and time liabilities in 1991 (of which
CRR was 25 per cent), has since been reduced and presently the combined ratio stands lowered at 32.5
per cent (of which, the SLR is at its statutory minimum of 25 per cent)10. This has enabled banks to
commit a greater quantum of resources for commercial purposes.
Third, the administered interest rate structure of banks, both on the deposit and lending side, has
been progressively rationalised. Prescriptions of rates on all term deposits (not below 7 days), including
conditions of premature withdrawal and offering uniform rate, irrespective of the size of deposits, have
been dispensed with. Currently, the only administered interest rate is on saving deposit (presently fixed at
4 per cent) which are used by individuals as current accounts. On the lending side, banks are required to
announce a Prime Lending Rate, which in tune with the international context acts as a benchmark rate and
loans to prime borrowers can be extended at sub-PLR at the bank's discretion. In order to ensure
10 As at end-March 2001, the banking system held Government securities of around 35 per cent of net demand and
time liabilities, which translated in volume terms, amounted to as much as Rs.1,00,000 crore (Reddy, 2001b).
8transparency, the maximum spread (not exceeding 4 per cent on the PLR) is required to be announced.
With regard to interest rate on smaller loans (i.e.,upto Rs.2 lakh), banks cannot charge above PLR.
Fourth, steps have been initiated to strengthen PSBs and infuse competition into the banking
system. Towards strengthening PSBs, the Government initiated steps to improve their autonomy and
increase their capital base through explicit recapitalisation through the fisc as well as changing legislation
to enable PSBs to raise resources from the market (Table 4). The capital injections between 1992-93 and
1999-2000 were around Rs.204 billion, equivalent to an annual average of around 0.2 per cent of GDP.
To increase competition, new banks in the private sector have been allowed to enter the industry and
foreign banks have been given more liberal entry. In addition, non-banking financial companies have
emerged as a competitive force in financial intermediation. In the rural areas, the competitive element has
been reinforced with the operationalization of five Local Areas Banks11 in the private sector, in addition
to the Cooperative and Regional Rural Banks (RRBs). The market segmentation has been reduced to a
great extent by allowing both banks and DFIs to enter into each others’ areas of operations, with banks
allowed to advance term loans and DFIs allowed to make short-term finance. On the liabilities side also,
DFIs are permitted to undertake short-term borrowings through Commercial Paper and term deposits,
with limits linked to their net worth. In addition, measures have been taken to broaden the ownership base
of PSBs (Table 5). As evident from Table 5, equity sales in the market aggregating around Rs.63 billion
have been made by 11 PSBs, with the State Bank approaching the market twice, in 1993, and again in
1996 (with a GDR issue), that together accounted for around 55 per cent of the total equity sales. Finally,
banks have been given flexibility to rationalise their branch network.
Fifth, a set of micro-prudential measures have been stipulated, aimed at imparting strength to the
banking system as well as ensuring safety and soundness on a prospective basis in order to fix ‘the true
position of bank’s balance sheet and…to arrest its deterioration’ (Rangarajan, 1996). With regard to
prudential requirements, norms for income recognition and asset classification (IRAC), introduced in
1992, have been strengthened over the years in line with international best practices (Table 6). A strategy
to introduce the attainment of CRAR of 8 per cent in a phased manner was put in place. Banks were
required to raise their CRAR from 4 per cent in the initial year (i.e., 1992-93) to 8 per cent over a period
of three years (i.e., by end-March 1996). Banks with international presence were required to attain the
prescribed CRAR of 8 per cent by 1993-94. As regards IRAC norms, the time (period overdue in
quarters) for classification of assets as non-performing has been tightened over the period, with a view to
11 Local Area Banks are akin to the new private sector banks, with two important differences: they are located in the
rural areas and have a paid up capital of Rs.50 crore.
9move towards the international best practice norm of 90 days by end-March 2004.12 Provisioning norms
have also been since prescribed at a minimum of 0.25 per cent for standard assets. The investment
portfolio of banks has also been streamlined, with the ‘mark-to-market’ proportion having been raised
over the years.
As regards capital adequacy, the prescribed ratio has been fixed at 9 per cent, effective end-
March 2000.13 Risk weights on Government securities and State Government securities have been
introduced basically recognising the vulnerability of banks to interest rate risk. From the end of March
2000, Government /approved securities are being provided for a risk weight of 2.5 per cent; an additional
risk weight of 20 per cent on investments in Government-guaranteed securities of public sector
undertakings is also in place. Foreign exchange open positions are assigned a 100 per cent risk weight.
Considerable work is underway to develop capital norms that adequately reflect market risk and draw
from internal control approach. These norms are broadly comparable with those prevailing in other Asian
and transition economies (Table 7). There is a conscious attempt in moving towards international best
practices in several areas in the recent period.14 A Standing Committee on International Financial
Standards and Codes (Chairman: Dr.Y.V.Reddy) has been constituted with the objective of identifying
and monitoring global developments, specially in the context of the world-wide efforts to create a sound
financial architecture and consider the applicability of global standards and codes to Indian conditions to
several broad areas of relevance to RBI (Reddy, 2001a). As Goodhart (1995) has pointed out, 'setting
standards is just the first step, maintaining them is the hard part'.
Sixth, the banking system has attained greater transparency. This applies both with regard to
prudential norms (disclosure of capital adequacy ratios-tier I and tier II separately, net non-performing
assets (NPAs) ratios, provisions and more recently, the maturity profile of loans and advances,
investments, movements in NPAs and lending to sensitive sectors, such as capital market, real estate and
commodities) as well as securities portfolio (greater ‘marking-to-market’)15. Public sector banks (PSBs)
would be attaching the balance sheet of the subsidiaries to their balance sheets beginning from 2000-01,
in order to bring greater transparency in operations and move towards consolidated supervision16. In
12 Revised provisioning norms have been recommended in the Monetary and Credit Policy of April 2001. Additional
provisions for such loans are required to be made by banks starting from the year ending March 2002.
13 As at end-March 2000, as many as 97 out of the 101 SCBs (except RRBs) had CRAR of 9 per cent and above.
The corresponding figures for 1995-96 were 54 out of a total of 92 banks.
14 To provide an example, with regard to NPAs, recent policy pronouncements have announced the intention to
move towards international standards, effective March 31, 2004.
15 Revised valuation norms for banks investment portfolio have been introduced in October 2000. These norms
require banks to classify their investment portfolio under three categories, ‘Held to Maturity’, ‘Available for Sale’
and ‘Held for Trading’, of which the first was not to exceed 25 per cent of total investments.15
16 Such a practice already exists for foreign banks operating in India. An exception is New Zealand, which follows a
market-based system of disclosure. Banks need to provide quarterly financial statement on leading ratios of
solvency, liquidity and asset quality, validated by bank directors, which are audited twice a year and made public.
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addition, the introduction of asset-liability management practices since April 1999 (subsequently
extended to financial institutions), fortified with the enunciation of risk management guidelines covering
broadly the areas of credit, market and operational risks have enabled banks to have a clearer idea of their
mismatches and undertake preventive steps.
By 1997-98, there was a significant improvement in the performance of the banking system. The
profitability of PSBs showed a distinct improvement, measured in terms of operating profits (from Rs.30
billion in 1992-93 to Rs.131 billion in 1999-2000) as well as in terms of net profits to total assets (from
losses in 1992-93 to Rs.51 billion in 1999-2000). Reflecting the efficiency of the intermediation process,
there has been a decline in the spread between the borrowing and lending rates as attested by the ratio of
net interest income to total assets from 3.22 per cent in 1991-92 to 2.70 per cent in 1999-2000 (Table 8).
As evident from the Table 8, the net profits of public sector banks have been the lowest among all
the bank groups, although their profits have improved considerably from –1.15 per cent of assets in 1993-
94 to 0.57 per cent in 1999-2000. In general, PSBs have lower interest costs about (6 per cent of assets)
than their private sector or foreign counterparts, perhaps reflecting their branch network and rural
presence where competition for funding is less than in urban areas. Non-interest income is traditionally
lower in PSBs than other bank groups, indicative, to an extent, of their lack of diversification of business
operations. Foreign banks, in contrast, tend to be outliers in all major income and expense items. These
banks had substantially higher net interest margin (which declined over time) and non-interest income
(reflecting their foreign exchange business) and higher operating expense per unit of assets.
The most significant improvement has been in terms of reduction in NPAs. As proportion of total
loans, gross NPAs of PSBs declined from 23 per cent in 1992-93 to 14.0 per cent in 1999-2000; net NPAs
declined by a factor of 1.5 from 11 per cent in March 1995 to 7.4 per cent in March 2000.17 The profile of
assets of PSBs has also undergone a transformation with over 87 per cent in the ‘standard’ category and
less than 2 per cent in the ‘loss’ category. The assets under ‘sub-standard’ and ‘doubtful’ heads have also
witnessed perceptible reduction (Table 9)18. At the same time, the capital adequacy ratios for PSBs have
An important feature of this system is that bank directors face unlimited liability is they are found guilty of making
false/misleading statements (Brash,1997).
17 In India, as in most countries, NPAs are only an indicator of loan performance. The degree to which it measures
actual NPAs depends on the quality of accounting, auditing, regulation and supervision and the amount of
‘evergreening’ of weak loans, though restructuring, which is a continual problem in India to judge from the
numerous circulars against the practice which the RBI has issued against it over the last decade (Hanson, 2001).
18 It needs to be underlined that NPAs in the Indian situation are based on the 180 days rule. Independent analysts
have expressed the opinion that the actual NPAs could be much higher if calculated on the international norm of 90
days rule. While the Indian authorities have desisted the move in view of the agricultural crop cycle of 6 months and
the system of 6 months interest reset, they have signaled the intention to move towards the 90 days norm by March
31, 2004. The true position would emerge by that date. However, contrary to international norms, net NPA figures in
India exclude collateral, which, in any case, are not easily realizable in view of the legal impediments.
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also increased significantly: as at end March 2000, as many as 26 PSBs had capital levels exceeding 9 per
cent of risk weighted assets; no less than 22 of them has the ratio above 10 per cent.
Seventh, the liberalisation measures have permitted a refocusing of supervisory strategy from one
of micro-management to one of macro-governance with the establishment of a quasi-autonomous Board
for Financial Supervision (BFS) in 1994. The supervisory strategy of the BFS consists of a four-pronged
approach, including (1) restructuring system of inspection, (2) setting up of off-site surveillance, (3)
enhancing the role of external auditors, and (4) strengthening corporate governance, internal controls and
audit procedures. Detailed off-site surveillance of banks, financial institutions and NBFCs is based on a
quarterly reporting framework covering mandated aspects of liquidity, solvency and asset quality. It has
been combined with on-site inspection, based on the evaluation of total operations and performance of
banks under the supervisory rating framework based on the CAMELS (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality,
Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Systems) methodology for Indian commercial banks and CACS
(Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Compliance and Systems) for foreign banks. The role of external
auditors has been enlarged: besides auditing of annual accounts, they are required to verify and certify
financial ratios to be disclosed in the balance sheet.19 This has enabled regulators to have a clearer
understanding of the true financial position of banks and take remedial measures, as warranted. The
supervisory focus has since been spruced up with the enunciation of a Discussion Paper on Prompt
Corrective Action for timely identification and monitoring the behaviour of troubled banks.20
This is not to say that the reforms process has been without its share of shortcomings. As the
World Development Report (1989) has observed, ‘this (financial liberalization) tends to increase financial
fragility’. It is true that the reforms process often enhances the vulnerability of the system. In a tightly
controlled system, it is easier to isolate and contain the problem. However, when the system is opened up
and markets become integrated, containing the systemic effects of an idiosyncratic shock might prove
difficult, since a shock in one sector of the economy might engender contagion effects in other sectors. In
order to counter this risk, the reform process needs to address the twin concerns of liberalizing whilst, at
the same time strengthening the institutional framework. The irregularities in the securities market in
1992 and the more recent one seems to suggest that the resilience of the system has improved.21 As a
19 The role of transparency in the banking system is illustrated in a recent paper by Hyytinen and Takalo (2000). The
authors show that transparency has both a direct cost of complying with disclosure requirements and the indirect
costs stemming from imperfect property rights governing information. The conditions under which transparency can
(and cannot) reduce financial fragility are then derived.
20 A discussion of the Prompt Corrective Action framework in different countries is contained in Hawkins and
Turner (1999).
21 Frauds have not been confined to emerging economies alone. The most infamous cases of bank failures have been
associated with frauds. Early cases of frauds such as Bank Ambrasiano in Italy in 1982, seem trivial compared to the
spectacular closure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International in 1991, where mismanagement jettisoned the
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negative test, one could compare the recent crisis in the Indian stock market with that of 1992. First, the
amount involved in the present case was just about 20-25 per cent of that in the 1992 crisis of Rs.6-8
billion. Second, when the last crisis surfaced, the working of the market was seriously impaired; in fact,
the stock market remained closed for several days, whereas this time around, no such system-level closure
has occurred. Third, as a fallout of the previous crisis, one bank went into liquidation; in the recent case,
while several banks were affected, bank failure has been averted and there has been no run on banks. This
testifies the resilience of the system and its ability to isolate the problem.
Ninth, a positive externality of the reform measures have been the building up of the institutional
architecture in terms of markets, technological and legal infrastructure and improving the managerial
competence and the quality of human resources, which are pre-requisites for the efficient functioning of
markets. Since 1997, there has been an intensification of efforts to develop and fortify the domestic
financial architecture, albeit with a distinct country-specific approach. Several new initiatives on the
technological front, including among others, the setting up of the Indian Financial Network (INFINET), a
Wide Area Satellite based Network using VSAT technology, Shared Payment Network System,
initiatives for Electronic Fund Transfer have already been undertaken. A Real Time Gross Settlement
(RTGS) system, with system requirement specifications to take into account international best practices
and the specific requirements of Indian banking is being developed.
Tenth, the changes in the policy environment have been supplanted with changes in the conduct
of monetary policy and financial markets. A sweep of the evolution of monetary policy during the
nineties has been detailed in Reddy (2001b). To briefly encapsulate the salient features of monetary
policy, the monetary policy framework followed in India from mid eighties till 1997-98 was by and large
a ‘monetary targeting’ framework, with broad money being the intermediate target. However, the
deregulation and liberalization of financial markets and increasing openness have necessitated the
adoption of a ‘multiple indicator’ approach in 1998-99, wherein interest rates or rates of return in
different markets (money, capital and Government securities markets) along with high frequency data on
currency, advances by banks and financial institutions, fiscal position, trade, capital flows, inflation rate,
exchange rate, refinancing and transactions in foreign exchange have been juxtaposed with output data for
drawing policy perspectives. While the twin objectives of monetary policy of maintaining price stability
and ensuring availability of adequate credit to productive sectors of the economy to support growth have
remained unchanged; the relative emphasis on either of these objectives have varied over the years
depending on the requirements of the macro-economy. With the change in the institutional context of
conduct of monetary policy pursuant upon the adoption of Ways and Means Advances (WMA) in 1997,
banking system to the tune of US $5-10 billion, Barings episode, where losses exceeded US $ 1 trillion and at Credit
Lyonnais, where frauds resulted in losses to the tune of US $ 17 billion.
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indirect instruments of monetary control have come to the fore.22 Consequently, the thrust of monetary
policy in recent years has been the use of instruments in a more flexible and bi-directional manner. A
Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) has been introduced since June 2000 to modulate short-term
liquidity and signal short-term interest rates. The LAF, in essence, operates through repo and reverse repo
auctions, thereby setting a corridor for the short-term interest rate consistent with policy objectives. This
has been supplanted with wide-ranging reforms in the financial markets (Appendix Table 1).23
After a long period of fixed exchange rate regime, a movement to a market-based regime was
effected in 1993. Alongside, several initiatives, including among others, the freedom to fix net overnight
position limit and gap limits, freedom to initiate trading position in the overseas markets; freedom to
borrow or invest funds in the overseas markets (up to 15 per cent of tier I capital, unless otherwise
approved); freedom to determine the interest rates (subject to a ceiling) and maturity period of Foreign
Currency Non-Resident (FCNR) deposits (not exceeding three years); exempting inter-bank borrowings
from statutory pre-emptions (subject to certain stipulations); and freedom to use derivative products for
asset-liability management have been undertaken. Substantial freedom has been accorded to corporates to
operate in the forex market. Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) have been allowed entry into equity and
debt markets and take forward cover and exporters have been permitted to retain a progressively
increasing proportion of their earnings in foreign currency accounts. The RBI buys and sells foreign
exchange at its discretion to ensure orderly conditions in the market.
III. Weaknesses in the Banking System
First, the reform measures aimed at reducing the repressive financial regulation, on the one hand,
and tightening prudential regulations, on the other. However, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears that
the process could have been better handled. As it is, the impact of the reduction in the financial
deregulation through freeing of interest rates is immediate, while the tightening of prudential regulations
takes time to make itself felt. Illustratively, the pace of deregulation in interest rates gained primacy over
the course of the reforms process than structural reforms. The primacy of interest rate deregulation has
focused on creating a framework that does not reflect financial repression. The nominal deposit rates
(excepting those on savings deposits) have generally been higher than the rate of inflation and the real
22 Until end-March 1997, thee was a system of automatic monetisation of the Government’s budget deficit by
creation of ad-hoc Treasury Bills (T-Bills) at an interest of 4.6 per cent. At the end of each year, the ad-hoc T-Bills
were converted into non-negotiable instruments in perpetuity at 4.6 per cent. Beginning April 1, 1997, this system
has been abolished and financing of temporary mismatches of revenue and expenditure of the Government is made
through a system of WMA, whose interest in linked to the Bank Rate.
23 A broad sweep of the changes in the various markets and the reforms undertaken is contained in Appendix Table
1. A study of the Appendix would serve to give an idea of the direction of reforms in the last five years, when the
RBI has been formally and directly involved in the development of the financial markets.
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lending rates are at times ranging from 8-10 per cent (Government of India, 2001). It seems pertinent to
mention in this context that McKinnon (1989) had advocated ceilings on deposits and interest rates in an
immature bank-led capital market. This issue will have to be confronted squarely at present, particularly
because a substantial section of the financial sector (e.g., cooperatives and NBFCs), which have been
offering high interest rates on deposits and have charged correspondingly higher interest rates on loans. In
a situation of predominantly bank-based system, the differential interest rate structure of different groups
of financial entities might jeopardize the signaling mechanism of the Bank Rate.
Thirdly, there still remain several gaps in the prudential norms. For example, the NPAs in the
Indian situation reflect the position based on the 180 days rule. Independent analysts have expressed the
opinion that the actual NPAs could be much higher if calculated on the international norm of 90 days rule.
While the Indian authorities had so far desisted the move in view of the agricultural crop cycle of 6
months and the system of 3 months interest reset that banks presently adopt, they have signaled the
intention to move towards the 90 days norm by March 31, 2004. The true position which would emerge
by that date would reveal the total quantum of NPAs in the banking system. However, contrary to
international norms, net NPA figures in India exclude collateral, which, in any case, are not easily
realizable in view of the legal impediments. In view of the fact that the norms for NPA classification in
India are less stringent than those prevalent abroad, the extent of improvement in NPA might not reveal
their actual quantum in the Indian context.
The fourth is the issue of directed lending. While it is generally accepted that the business of
banking essentially involves risk-taking, which might be especially high when banks lend to borrowers of
uncertain quality at fixed/concessional rates, this raises issues of incentives. In a developing economy
with a democratic polity and a large number of people below poverty line, certain policy pronouncements
often fail to achieve the desired effects. This is reflected in the fact that while banks are enjoined to
undertake directed lending, definitional relaxation have been provided to impart a certain degree of relief
to banks from lending to priority sector and invest the same in low-risk bonds of specified financial
institutions. Likewise, at the operating level, there are reasons to believe that whereas political-economy
considerations are compelling banks to continue to lend under the various schematic lending programmes,
the credit-deposit (C-D) ratio of PSBs and RRBs tell a different story. Illustratively, the C-D ratio of
SCBs declined from over 75 per cent as at end-June 1969 to 51 per cent as at end-March 1994; it
improved thereafter to touch 53.3 per cent at end-March 2000. A decline in the flow of credit to the
agricultural sector can have serious consequences with regard to sustained growth and viability of the
agricultural sector.
Fifthly, another problem relates to the vesting of ownership and control with the same agency.
Even after decades of state control, the Government is unwilling to let go of its control in PSBs. As it
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stands at present, the Reserve Bank holds ownership position in certain banks (the State Bank and its
Associates) and RBI officials serve as Directors on these and other banks' Board of Directors. Apart from
problems of corporate governance, this in effect has constrained the functional autonomy and operational
independence of banks. There has been a strong apprehension that existing arrangements might engender
conflict of interest between the Reserve Bank as owner/manager and its role as regulator and supervisor.
A re-ordering of relationship between Government as principal/owner and banks as agents, through
legislative changes or otherwise, is therefore deemed as necessary.
A sixth weakness is that of weak corporate governance practices in PSBs. Multiple layering of
'principal-agent' chains in the case of PSBs by virtue of Government holding creates unauthorised power
centres outside the chain of command. The Government ownership also creates problems for the RBI as
regulator/supervisor of the financial system, since it acts as a 'quasi-regulator'. Corporate governance in
PSBs gets complicated because the effective power rests with the Government and not with Bank Boards,
making the management of the banks accountable to the Government and not the Boards, that operate as
mere functionaries. Second, there is no equality among the various Board members of the PSBs. For
instance, certain committees of the Board cannot function unless the Government/RBI Directors
participate, effectively curtailing the rights of the other Board members. These issues would remain in the
forefront since even after the proposed dilution of Government stake, it would continue to remain the
single, dominant shareholder24.
The success of the reform process, therefore, depends on the responses forthcoming from the
Government, the RBI and the banking sector. In this context, it is important that the weaknesses in the
banking system are pro-actively addressed, as otherwise, banking failures worldwide have provided
graphic evidence of the damaging consequences of crises for the macro-economy. It is to these issues that
we turn our attention. It seems opportune to mention at this juncture that the set of issues is illustrative
and would need to be viewed in conjunction with several broader issues, both in the real and financial
sectors, for deriving a more meaningful perspective of the present status of the reform process.
IV. Emerging Challenges in Indian Banking
Not surprisingly, the reforms have been a mixed bag. While there have no doubt been some
successes in the aftermath of the reforms, they have not been without their pitfalls. The obvious question
that therefore arises is: what are the emerging challenges and how can they be tackled?
24 It may be pertinent to note that in Belgium, while registering with the Banking Commission, the dominant
shareholder/promoter of banks have to sign a protocol of managerial autonomy giving a commitment that they will
not, in any way, interfere with the freedom of the management and the Board of Directors.
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It is important in this context to note that, given the size of the financial system broadly defined,
the question of banking soundness cannot be analyzed in isolation of the broader system (Crockett, 1997).
This is because financial disturbances, wherever they originate, can have serious consequences for the
real economy. This is also a logical consequence of Walras law, which states that disequilibrium in one
particular market must imply an out of equilibrium position in at least one other market. And importantly,
special attention needs to be paid to banks, especially in emerging economies25. Although they might be
declining in overall importance when measured by the volume of transactions or the relative scale of
financial intermediation, they remain of strategic importance, notwithstanding the importance of other
major entities in the financial system, viz., development financial institutions and NBFCs. It is in this
context that a thorough analysis of the challenges facing Indian banks is taken up. The PSBs in India have
strategically been the engines of growth, not only for economic activity, but also for the financial sector
through its various para-banking channels like mutual funds, merchant banking, housing finance, and the
like. Not surprisingly, PSBs have been historically viewed as instruments of delivery of Government
policies, and consequently, a large quantum of economic and social investment has been dovetailed into
them. As a consequence, it is of no surprise that any constructive dialogue on the status of financial sector
reform in India will perforce need to focus predominantly on the banking segment, with an emphasis on
public sector banks, in particular.
1. Structure of the Financial System: Pre-liberalisation, the Indian banking system was protected from
the vagaries of business cycle by high levels of statutory pre-emptions and a control over flow of credit.
Additionally, the lending portfolios of banks also included exposures on account of financing for food
procurement operations and debts guaranteed by the sovereign or sub-sovereign. While this had the effect
of generating guaranteed profitability, it also made the system highly fragile26. While that might not be
the case at present, given the comfortable capital adequacy of PSBs27 alongside reduction in NPAs, it
clearly brings out the fragility of the Indian banking system. Clearly, with a greater quantum of resources
for lending purposes, banks would need to be pro-active in management of their asset portfolio as
opposed to liabilities alone in order to withstand pressure on their bottom line.
Although the PSBs dominate the banking sector, increased competition has reduced their
dominance somewhat since financial liberalization was initiated. Competition has come from various
25 Rojas Suarez and Weisbrod (1994) has documented that banks play a much more important role in the financial
systems in emerging markets than they do in industrialized economies.
26 Assuming a normalized deposit of Rs.100, it was shown that the total loss is Rs.9.31. With aggregate deposit in
July 1992 being Rs.2.45 trillion, the aggregate net worth of the banking system, adjusted for capital reserves, turns
out to be (negative) of Rs.90 billion (Verma, 1992).
27 As at end-March 2000, 26 out of 27 PSBs met the stipulated capital adequacy ratio of 9 per cent. By contrast, as at
end-March 1996, only 21 of these banks met the the-then stipulated capital adequacy ratio of 8 per cent.
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quarters: development financial institutions (DFIs), the capital market, NBFCs, foreign banks and the new
private sector banks. DFIs have increased their shares of financial assets in the early 1990s, but their
growth has since slowed down and for several of them, their assets have deteriorated and they are
restructuring in order to re-position themselves in the new financial marketplace. Both the NBFCs and the
capital market grew rapidly after liberalisation as sources of funding, with the capital market, in turn,
benefiting from liberalised portfolio inflows. While the role of the NBFC sector has declined somewhat,
the importance of the capital market has, by and large, remained intact.
The issue that arises, therefore, is: what can be said about the changing facet of PSBs? Within the
commercial banking sector, the new private banks have grown to account for about 4-5 per cent of
commercial bank assets by end-March 2000; the share of foreign banks has increased by about one
percentage point around 3 per cent, and even the old private sector banks have increased their share by
over a percentage point. Correspondingly, the share of PSBs has declined to about 80 per cent28. The new
private and foreign banks have increased competition for the best clients and are eroding the share of
PSBs in terms of assets at about 1 per cent per annum. This has created a chasm between the relatively
technology-savvy new private sector/foreign banks (and to a certain extent, the better performing PSBs)
and the remaining ones. At the same time, the bank asset to GDP ratio, which was around 70 per cent at
the beginning of the nineties has declined to about 64 per cent by 1999-2000. Consequently, the
competition among banks is on a shrinking pie. The loss of business by PSBs, especially the niche
clientele might adversely impact their portfolio and more so at a time, when sub-PLR lending has been
permitted. PSBs would need to re-position themselves to not only protect their client base, but also to
avoid adverse selection problems by reckless lending to built upon their credit portfolio, possibly by
adopting an integrated risk management strategy, encompassing the areas of credit, market and
operational risks. The pressure on bottom line and franchise values (present value of future economic
profits) would need to be taken into account in the strategy for dealing with the PSBs and their
privatisation.
A time has also come for the Government/RBI to consider whether the financial system is
‘optimal’ in terms of the number of banks, or whether there is a case for rationalization of branch network
(along with mergers of few banks). The existence of a large number of banks in public sector is widely
viewed as a matter of historical accident and a more rational view on economic considerations would
need to be taken. The PSBs vary greatly in size, branch network, deposit base and asset quality. If these
banks are to improve their standards of service and compete more effectively with their new private and
foreign counterparts, they would need to be more capitalized, automated and technology-oriented, even
28 The State Bank Group still accounts for about 30 per cent of commercial bank assets, with the State Bank alone
constituting around 25 per cent.
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while strengthening their internal operations and systems. While capital levels of these banks have
improved, they would need to be augmented further to enable them to effectively compete with their
counterparts abroad, who are much bigger in terms of their size and asset base. It is in this context that a
restructuring of these banks is deemed as important (NCR-II, 1998). In the absence of full-blown reforms
in the labour sector, which still suffers from high levels of rigidities, the structural issues could pose a
major stumbling block. This point was also echoed in NCR-II, where it was observed that 'if Indian banks
are to be made more comparable with their competitors from abroad with regard to the size of their capital
and assets base, it would be necessary to restructure these banks' (pp.48). One is also witnessing a degree
of mergers/acquisitions moves among the new private sector banks. It appears that the new private sector
banks with institutional parentage are making tremendous strides. They are also performing well in terms
of enhancing shareholder value. While they could be seen in the not-too-distant future to consolidate their
operations further, it is the PSBs that need to take prompt action. In view of the overlap of operations
among PSBs, another aspect of re-sizing which has gained currency is rationalization and restructuring
the branch network of the weak banks in such a fashion that the unviable rural branches of these banks is
taken over by the Asset Reconstruction Fund (ARF)/converted to a separate entity, while the viable urban
branches is merged with some of the strong banks.
2. Capital Adequacy: Imposition of minimum capital adequacy requirements promotes more prudent
management of commercial banks. A high capital adequacy requirement limits the ability to extend
additional loans and thus contains inter-bank competition, which would increase the financial cushion of
commercial banks to cope with a volatile economic environment (Eichengreen, 1999)29.
Studies reveal that capital has been instrumental in influencing bank behaviour in the Indian
context. In other words, capital requirements do seem to affect bank behaviour over and above the
influence of the banks’ own internally generated capital targets. More importantly, such adjustments by
banks in their capital ratios are effected primarily by boosting their capital rather than through systematic
substitution away from high-risk loans (Nachane et al., 2000). However, the capital levels still slightly
exceed the volume of net NPAs, on average. The (weighted) average capital ratio for PSBs has risen
from 8.7 per cent of risk weighted assets in 1996 to 11.2 per cent in 1999. However, with the risk weight
29 A contrary viewpoint has been expressed by Hellmann et al. (2000). They observe that, in a liberalised, dynamic
economy, capital requirements might not prove to be an effective instrument of regulation. This is because, in
addition to a one-period ‘capital-at-risk’ effect that reduces the incentive to gamble, there is a future-franchise-value
effect that increases the incentive to gamble. In such a situation, while a sufficiently large capital requirement can
generate an equilibrium in which banks choose to invest efficiently, the equilibrium is Pareto-efficient. Alternately,
a regulatory regime that uses both deposit-rate controls and capital requirements Pareto-dominates a regime based
on capital requirements alone.
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of Government debt and cash reserves being negligible30, which represents roughly 30-35 per cent of
assets, the volume of capital is not much larger than net NPAs.
It also needs to be recognized that the prescription of norms is not sufficient for good banking:
‘stress testing’ of figures is required to ensure that the banking system is resilient to adverse macro-
economic shocks. In this context, in order to understand the consequences of an adverse shock to the
system and examine how far the (banking) system is able to withstand such shocks, we conducted a 'stress
test' of a vulnerability to credit risk. We consider two scenarios (1) where 13 per cent of the loans become
non-performing and provisioning is made at 10 per cent, and (2) where 5 per cent of the loans become
non-performing and provisions are made at 35 per cent. While the first case represents an extreme
situation of highest NPA growth witnessed by the PSBs in a particular year, wherein provisions are made
at 10 per cent slipping into sub-standard category, scenario 2 depicts a situation of the average NPA
growth of the PSBs over the span of the reforms process and the average level of provisioning that PSBs
make on NPAs.31 The results reveal that in the first case, capital is reduced to a quarter of its actual
amount by the 11th year (and virtually wiped out by the 20th year), and in the second case, capital is
reduced to zero by the end of the 6th year. The post-shock time path of capital under the two scenarios is
presented in Exhibit 1 and the one period post-shock scenario is presented in Table 10. The immediate
effect of the NPAs is a loss of interest income to the PSBs to the tune of Rs.55 billion (0.6 per cent of
assets) under the first scenario and Rs.21 billion (0.2 per cent of assets) under scenario 2. We also find
that the maximum additional provision that can support the present capital adequacy level of 9 per cent is
Rs.70 billion. Our analysis supports the observations by Sheng (1996) who showed that NPA level of 15
per cent would suffice to wipe out the net worth of the banking sector in 15 years.
The capital of the PSBs has increased in three ways: Government capital injections, equity sales
to the public and retained earnings, which are relatively small. The Government’s total injections over
Rs.200 billion between 1992-93 and 1998-99, equivalent to an annual average of nearly 0.3 per cent of
GDP, has primarily been in the form of non-marketable Government bonds paying 10 percent, which has
added to the share of Government debt in the recipient banks. Excluding the interest income on
recapitalisation bonds is likely to substantially affect the net profits of PSBs32.
In spite of the wide heterogeneity among PSBs in terms of their product sophistication and
customer orientation, the present prescription of CRAR is that of ‘one-size-fits-all’. Given their wide
divergences, an important aspect for consideration is whether individual banks could be encouraged to
30 Prior to March 2000, risk weights on Government securities and standard assets were zero.
31 The PLR of five major commercial banks during 1999-2000 was 12-13 per cent. Accordingly, the average interest
rate on loans is taken to be 12.5 per cent.
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maintain higher CRAR than the stipulated minimum, to reflect their differential risk profiles33. This seems
all the more relevant at a time when measurement of risk-weighted assets proves problematic, in view of
the deficiencies in the valuation of collateral, the weaknesses in legal system which inhibits prompt
recovery and the inadequate risk management techniques34. The recommendations contained in the NCR-
II of raising the minimum CRAR to 10 per cent by 2002 with the [RBI] having the authority to raise this
further in respect of individual banks ‘if in its judgment the situation with respect to their risk profile
warrants such an increase’35 (emphasis added) merits consideration.
3. Bank Recapitalisation: The experience of bank recapitalisation in several parts of the world has
demonstrated that the exercise of recapitalisation does not necessarily prevent banks from rushing into
headlong trouble again (Hawkins and Turner, 1999). In fact, it often serves to distort the incentive
structure, erode discipline and reaffirm the faith of these institutions in the ‘deep pockets’ of the
Government. Recapitalisation of weak banks using public money is also a costly and unsustainable
option, in view of the increasing strains on the Government exchequer. Recent studies (Standard & Poor
and CRISIL, 1999) have estimated that India's scheduled commercial banks require between US$11
billion to US$13 billion in new capital to support losses embedded in impaired assets. It appears that,
even after allowing for additional infusion of capital through internal generation and access to sub-
ordinated debt, the gap between the capital required by these banks and the leeway available to raise the
same from market sources, is likely to remain significant. The obvious question which merit attention is
whether the gap should be filled by the Government or alternately, whether the legislative ceiling for
public subscription should be raised. At a time when the Government exchequer is under stress, the
former does not seem to be a viable solution. Recapitalisation of public sector banks also does not seem to
be feasible, since it would be tantamount to monetisation with potentially inflationary implications. In this
context, the Government has indicated that it will adopt a gradual privatisation agenda where it ownership
of PSBs will be gradually reduced over a period of time. Such proposal to dilute equity raises some
difficult issues. First, though gradual, it will necessitate Parliamentary approval for a further change in
laws, since the Banking Companies-Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings Act, 1969 still requires the
32 Given the overhang of Government securities carried by the banking system, it might be worthwhile to explore the
possibility of consider foreclosing the debt by utilising the sale proceeds of disinvestment towards foreclosure of
low-coupon Government debt.
33 This approach has been termed as 'supervision-plus'. In other words, 'prudential regulation should be seen as
minimum requirements and banks should set internal benchmarks which are over and above those mandated by
supervisors' (Talwar, 2001).
34 In the U.K., for instance, banks are subject to a ‘trigger’ ratio, which is the minimum capital ratio that banks must
comply with and a ‘target’ ratio, set above the trigger ratio. Such a gap between the target and the trigger acts as a
buffer in the sense that regulatory pressure is initiated when the capital ratio falls below the target, which becomes
increasingly severe as the ratio approach the trigger level (Ediz et al., 1998).
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Government to hold more than 51 per cent of nationalised bank equity. Second, the Union Budget 1999-
2000 announced the intention of the Government to reduce its holdings in PSBs to 33 per cent, while
ensuring that banks retain their ‘public sector character'36. The RBI has been of the view that even if the
economy grows at the current rate and capital adequacy norms are the same as at present, the banks
(barring the three weak banks) would require Rs.100 billion over the next five years. Such a move might
turn out to be counter-productive, in the sense that such privatization might result in long-term greater
cost to the Government, if, in an eventuality, it is required to support the banks in the future, since their
closure might not be feasible on political-economy grounds as it might cause unacceptably high level of
socio-economic distress 37. In addition, two other issues merit consideration. The first is the modalities
and sources of raising such a large quantum of resources, owing to the lack of depth and liquidity of the
equity market. Second, the performance of some of the banks which have divested in so far as their equity
is concerned have not been very encouraging. As it is, net profit exclusive of income from recapitalisation
bonds for nationalised banks has risen marginally from Rs.6.1 billion in 1996-97 to Rs. 6.4 billion in
1999-00.
4. Pro-cyclicity of Prudential Norms: One of the difficulties of implementing capital adequacy
requirement is that bank behaviour tends to be pro-cyclical, independently of the regulations in place and
the need for such tightening usually becomes manifest when recession or adverse shocks impinge upon
the system, revealing the lacuna in existing systems (BIS, 2000). During booms, growth and rising asset
prices can disguise fundamental underlying problems.
An important question that arises is whether bank regulations should be tightened during a
recession or a boom. Two contradictory views have emerged in the literature: on one hand, tightening of
the requirement may lead to a curtailment of bank credit. On the other, sustainable growth is unlikely to
resume until confidence in the banking system is restored-especially in countries with inadequate
standards and provision.
The pro-cyclicity of prudential regulations raises an important issue about adequacy of capital in
India. In other words, what could be the appropriate cyclically adjusted ratio that might mitigate moral
35 Report of the Committee on Banking Sector Reforms, 1998, pp.21. para 3.15.
36 The ‘public sector character' of PSBs was espoused by Jalan (2000) in view of the twin concerns of PSBs to give
adequate attention to agricultural credit and rural banking, while at the same time, maintain public confidence in the
safety of these banks, in case there is a divestment of shareholding in these banks, given the resource constraints on
the exchequer.
37 Till 1999-2000, the Government has expended Rs.56 billion (equivalent to 27 per cent of the recapitalisation
amount of Rs.204 billion) in augmenting the capital base of three banks identified as weak by the Working Group on
Weak Public Sector Banks. These injections of capital do not show up as part of the Government deficit, because
they take the form of an exchange of 9non-marketable) Government debt for equity, thereby increasing the share of
Government debt in the banks’ portfolio.
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hazard behaviour? The timing and extent of progress in tightening of such regulations would have to take
into account the cyclical factors in the economy. This would require correct identification of the cycle.
Second, adequate notice would need to be provided to market participants to enable them to be fully
prepared to meet the changing prescriptions. Finally, intense consultation process in detailing the
prudential regulations would be necessary so that 'prudential regulations [are] introduced at an
‘appropriate’ pace, in order to reach the objective of meeting financial standards as soon as feasible
(Reddy, 2001c). This needs to be tempered with an understanding of the fact that while capital levels
might provide effective cushion in an upswing, they might prove to be inadequate in downturns, as firms
find difficulty to service their loans. Therefore, as each firm attempts to satisfy their capital adequacy
standards, the whole system may find its strategy completely undermined, eventually resulting in a
worsening of capital adequacy standards. It is therefore necessary to find out the levels of NPAs at which
confidence in the banking system can be maintained at high levels, and, at the same time, the level of
CRAR needed to sustain the NPA level. The necessity of raising the minimum CRAR to 10 per cent
needs to be viewed in this light. Two important questions need to be addressed in this context: whether
the CRAR of 10 per cent is sufficient to maintain confidence in the banking system, given the present
levels of NPAs in the PSBs; and, second, first, how far are all the PSBs capable of reaching the 10 per
cent CRAR. As at end-March 2001, as many as 23 PSBs had reported to have exceeded the CRAR of 10
per cent; while the reported level of gross NPAs to total assets stood at 5.3 per cent38. As at end-March
2000, wherein 22 out of 27 banks had CRAR exceeding 10 per cent and the gross NPA to total asset
figures were equal to 5.5 per cent of total assets.
5. Treatment of Weak Banks: A sound banking system by definition presupposes that all the banks, or
at least a majority of them within the system are strong and good as viable concerns. However, every
system has its own instances of weak links and the banking system is no exception. It is, therefore,
desirable to discuss the options available to the weak banks for ensuring resilience of the system. While
the root cause of a bank becoming weak can be traced to managerial inadequacies, existence of high
NPAs is one of the prominent manifestations. Poor quality of assets confronted with stringent IRAC
norms can and sometimes does result in wiping out the entire (or a substantial) portion of the net worth of
a bank (Sheng, 1996).
It is often argued that the problem of weakness in the banking sector has had its roots in directed
lending on behest of the Government, and that the latter has the responsibility to bail out the weak
institutions. One of the proposals to effect this bailout, without direct recapitalisation, mooted in NCR-I,
was the proposal to setting up ARF to take over the bad assets from these troubled at a discount, follow-
38 These figures are as reported in the audited balance sheet of these banks for the year ended 2000-01.
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up the loans and effect recovery. While variants of such institutional arrangements to tackle the problem
of bad loans have been an integral part of bank restructuring programmes, in countries as Spain, Sweden,
Philippines and more recently in Japan, Malaysia and Korea (Sheng, 1996; Hawkins and Turner, 1999),
the ARF did not find favour in India for several reasons (RBI, 1992-93). First, it was felt that a centralised
all-India fund would be severely handicapped in its recovery efforts by lack of widespread geographical
reach which individual banks possess. Second, there could be a moral hazard problem, making banks
complacent about recovery. Finally, given the large fiscal deficits facing the Government, there was a
problem financing the ARF. Unfortunately, the legal framework does not exactly provide an enabling or
conducive framework to address this issue.
Subsequently, the Verma Committee on Restructuring Weak PSBs formalised the proposal for an
ARF39. Such a proposal has raised several crucial issues. First, the institution of ARF is crucially based on
the presumption that it would be successful in recovering bad debts of the banking sector where the banks
themselves have failed, as otherwise, the ARF could itself become sick after a period of time! The
absence of strong bankruptcy and foreclosure laws in India are as likely to hamper the recovery
operations of specialised Asset Management Companies (AMCs) as they do banks and financial
institutions. This contrasts to the US S&L debacle where the depth of the markets coupled with their high
marketable value could enable high recoveries, which limited the damages to a great extent. Second, it is
important to note that to the extent there is a gap between what is recovered and what it will have to pay
to its bondholders, the shortfall for an ARF will have to be made good by the Government, since the
bonds would be guaranteed by it. An option might be to fix a time frame for the ARF to achieve its
results; otherwise, the Government will not be obliged to bridge the shortfall. However, unless it is
assumed that over the period, the weak banks become strong enough to absorb the transfer of some bad
loans, this might defeat the very purpose of setting up the ARF. Third, while the ARF might effect a ‘one-
time’ cleaning of the balance sheet of banks of their non-performing loans, this does not foreclose the
possibility of the bank turning weak once again owing to inadequacies in their business revenue model.
A second proposal on the treatment of weak banks has been that of narrow banking (Tarapore,
1999). This would include restricting the incremental resources of these institutions only to investments in
high quality marketable securities of minimal risk to completely match the maturity profile and liquidity
39 The details are contained in the Report of the Working Group on Restructuring Weak Public Sector Banks (1999).
The salient features are (1) ARF to be set up under a Special Act of Parliament, (2) a two-tier structure whereby
ownership of assets lies with the Government and the management thereof with an independent private Asset
Management Company (AMC) equipped with necessary professional expertise, (3) share capital of ARF to be
subscribed by Government sources, (4) majority shareholding of AMC to be non-Governmental, (5) mctivities to be
initially restricted to the NPAs of the identified weak banks, (6) focus on comparatively large NPAs, and (7) ARF to
have a life span not exceeding seven years.
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needs of their deposit liabilities.40 However, the risks involved in narrow banking are underrated in this
view of the banking business (Ghosh and Saggar, 1998). One might adduce several reasons behind this
assertion. For one, much as narrow banking reduces liquidity and credit risks, it exposes the banks to
increased market and interest rate risks, as the entire asset portfolio of banks comprises of marketable
securities. Second, the implicit assumption behind narrow banking is that Government securities have
zero default risk attached to them. This proposition is not necessarily borne out by empirical evidences as
instances of repudiation of sovereign debt (in Mexico and Russia) have not been uncommon in the history
of financial markets. Third, the proposal to covert a commercial bank into a narrow bank in itself can be
detrimental to the reputation of the bank management and the faith of depositors, enhancing the
probability of a run on the institution. Fourth, other things remaining the same, narrow banking can only
tackle the problem at the increment; it overlooks the issue of overhang. Whether narrow banking should
not be adapted would lie in whether the balance of advantages exceeds the disadvantages. However,
narrow banking can best be viewed as an interim solution to turn around the weak banks.
It has also been suggested in informed quarters that in such banks, there should be a control on
the growth of risk assets, depending on their degree of weakness. Such actions would need to be
complemented by addressing the underlying causes of inefficiency in the workings of these banks,
particularly in the areas of autonomy in bank management, staff resizing, branch rationalisation, and
changes in work culture, for such restructuring to be viable in the long-run. The question of weak banks is
sensitive in character, given the political-economy considerations and stiff opposition from unionized
leadership to the closure and downsizing of these institutions.
The Union Budget 2000-01 announced the setting up of a Financial Restructuring Authority
(FRA) in a modified form, from the one suggested by the Verma Committee in respect of any bank
considered to be potentially weak. The FRA, comprising experts and professionals, would be given
powers to supersede the Board of Directors on the basis of the recommendations of the Reserve Bank.
6. Non-Performing Assets: Although non-performing assets have been substantially reduced since
regulation was tightened in 1993, especially in the PSBs, the momentum has recently slowed down and
the levels of NPAs remain high compared to international standards. As at end-March 2000, the gross
NPAs to total assets of SCBs (excluding RRBs) stood at 5.5 per cent; net of provisions, it was 2.7 per
cent. The PSBs gross NPA to asset ratio was slightly higher at 6.0 per cent and 2.9 per cent, net of
40 The underlying rationale is two fold: (1) to reduce asset-liability mismatches, thereby minimising the risk of bank
runs, and (2) to minimise credit risk for banks and foreclose the possibility of further build-up of any NPAs.
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provisions, respectively (Exhibit 2)41. The NPAs of US banks in 1997 were 1.1 per cent of loans and 0.66
per cent of assets (Goldstein, 1996). The comparable figures for other countries were 1.0 per cent for
Korea, 7.6 per cent for Thailand, 5.9 per cent for Brazil and 3.3 per cent for Japan.42
Studies on NPA in the Indian context suggest that the problems of NPAs have a sizeable
overhang component, arising from infirmities in the existing processes of debt recovery, inadequate legal
provisions for foreclosure and bankruptcy and difficulties in the execution of court decrees 43. As a
consequence, many institutions have been adopting ingenious ways of suppressing the true level of NPAs,
thus resorting to ‘ever-greening’44. The problem is exacerbated by the regulatory provisions for loan
classification vis-à-vis international best practices. One such case is in regard to consortium lending. For
instance, a loan account becomes non-performing if the interest/installment is not paid for two quarters.
Besides, even in a consortium, each bank has to classify the borrowal accounts according to its own
record of recovery. The operation of these two provisions often creates a piquant situation wherein each
member of the consortium reports an account as a performing asset, when, in practice, at the aggregate
level, it is a non-performing loan!
Operationally, it seems imprudent to treat all non-performing loans as a single ‘catch-all’
category. Broadly, they can be categorized into several categories, viz., loans to agricultural sector,
directed lending, loans to small enterprises and loans to corporate sector. Many of the directed loans are
subsistence loans, where default rates are high and recovery prospects not bright. As regards loan to
agricultural borrowers, legal impediments often prove to be a challenging proposition for banks to recover
their dues45. Loans to small enterprise become difficult to recover due to in-ordinate judicial delays. Even
if court decrees can be obtained towards recovery, by the time the charge of the assets is taken, its
realizable value is significantly diminished because of several reasons including depreciation of the asset,
lack of borrowers, limited market value of the asset, with the concomitant effect that such decrees are not
executed. As regards corporate loans, suits pending/referred to Board for Industrial and Financial
Reconstruction leaves little headroom for banks to effect recovery. The banks also suffer from the
dilemma of a working capital lender. In a protected/regulated economy, the propensity of an entrepreneur
to continuously upgrade his technology/machinery is low, and therefore, the average age of the machinery
is high. Consequently, the working capital lender finds himself in a situation of increasing commitments
41 Simple average of CRAR and net NPA ratio of top 5 banks (in terms of assets) for the period 1995-96 to 1999-
2000.
42 The figures are average of 1990-94 figures and are as per cent of total loans.
43 Gavin and Hausman (1996) show that publicly reported figures on NPAs provided little hint of banking crisis in
Chile and Colombia in the early 1980s.
44 There are several ways in which this can be effected. For example, when an account becomes non-performing, it
can be converted to foreign currency loan with bullet payment with guarantee. Alternately, the loan can be swapped
in exchange for fixed assets of the company whose marketable value is weak.
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vis-à-vis rapidly depreciating, outmoded equipment and outdated technology. Such loans, which are large
in number in Indian banks, become highly vulnerable to the market forces when the economy is opened
up, with the possibility of slippage of these loans into non-performance. Under such a scenario, there
remains the vexed issue as to who would take the decision towards write-offs. Inadequate corporate
governance practices coupled with problems of fixation of accountability leaves little maneuverability for
banks towards an all-out recovery drive. With the environmental changes that are taking place, it seems
that the credit portfolio of banks is becoming vulnerable and the issue of NPAs would need to be tackled
head-on.
It needs to be realised that there are no ‘quick-fix’ solutions in tackling the NPA problem.
Prospectively, a lasting solution to the viscous problem of NPAs can be achieved when financial
institutions put in place a sophisticated system of credit assessment and an integrated risk management
mechanism, backed by a prompt and efficient legal framework. In a situation of liquidity overhang,
banks, in their attempt to book fresh business and maximise returns may go in for selection of assets
which may later turn out to be cases of adverse selection, resulting in NPAs. However, if the banking
system is equipped with balanced prudential norms, these problems can, to a large extent, be minimised,
if not avoided. This calls for organisational restructuring, improvement in managerial efficiency, skill
upgradation for proper assessment of creditworthiness and an attitudinal change towards legal action
(Jalan, 2001).
7. Legal Framework: The issue of NPAs is intimately related to the question of legal framework. The
legal framework sets standards of behaviour for market participants, details of rights and responsibilities
of transacting parties, assures that completed transactions are legally binding and provides regulators with
the teeth to enforce standards and ensure compliance and adherence to law. The legal framework is a key
ingredient for limiting moral hazard. In developing and transition countries, including those that fall
under the rubric of emerging markets, there is often a basic need for workable laws on contract, collateral
and bankruptcy proceedings, as well as a need to implement and streamline court procedures for seeking
effective and rapid remedy under these laws. But the issue extends also to highly developed legal and
judicial systems because the continual state of innovation and evolution of new financial products can
outrun existing legislation and raise fine points of law. The banking system requires a legal system, which
facilitates the enforcement of financial contracts. The system must not only be impartial, but also display
sufficient understanding of financial transactions so that the banking system can rely on fair and prompt
enforcement of their contractual rights and obligations.
45 The Prevention of Alienation of Agricultural Land Act, for instance.
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In India, prior to the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, the
two modes available to banks to recover their debts or realising the securities pledged to them had been to
file a suit against a borrower in the Civil Courts and retaining the pledged goods as collateral till debts
were realised, or alternately, selling the goods by giving prior notice to the borrower without court
intervention. However, since the Courts were flooded with such matters, settlement of such claims were
inevitably long delayed, which meant a deterioration in the quality and a deflation in the commercial
value of the security assets charged by the borrower on the lending institutions, compelling the former to
write-off such debts. Further, Section 22 of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985
provides that once a sick company46 stands referred to the Board for Industrial and Financial
Reconstruction (BIFR), no proceedings for (1) winding up such company, (2) for execution of the
properties of such company, or (3) the appointment of a receiver thereof and (4) no suit filed for recovery
of money, can be effected, except with the consent of BIFR. This enabled the borrowers to take refuge by
getting their companies referred to BIFR, and gaining automatic immunity from suits or actions for
recovery of dues. 47 A significant portion of bank funds has, therefore, been blocked in unproductive
assets, whose value keeps on deteriorating with the passage of time.48 This has also been one of the major
contributory factors behind the high NPA levels in the Indian banking sector.
The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, suggested a six-month
time frame for disposal of every application for debt recovery through the recently instituted Debt
Recovery Tribunals (DRTs). Such limits often cannot be respected given the current operational state of
the tribunals, including poor location, lack of appropriate staffing49 and the virtual absence of modern
office infrastructure, including information technology support. This has unduly lengthened the time lag
for hearings and even further time is expended for issue of recovery certificates. Data reveals that as at
end-March 1999, out of the total number of 21,781 cases involving a sum of Rs.18 billion transferred
to/filed with the DRTs, the number of cases decided was 3,774 or 17.3 per cent of the total and they
accounted for 10 per cent of the total locked-up amount in the cases transferred to/filed with DRTs. It is
important that the automatic nature of the blanket immunity granted by the present scheme of Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 be suitably rectified to remove the incentive for
promoters to get their companies declared as sick to perpetuate defaults or negotiate more favourable
terms. More recent work in this area is reflected in the Government of India’s constitution of an Expert
Group under the Chairmanship of Shri T.R.Andhyarujina, former Solicitor General of India, to suggest
46 Defined as a company, registered for not less than five years, whose net worth has been fully eroded.
47 Of the roughly 4,000 firms that have entered the BIFR since 1987, 80 per cent are still under consideration.
Moreover, once the BIFR reaches a judgment, it can be appealed through a court system (Hanson, 2001).
48 As on December 31, 2000, an amount of Rs.552 billion was locked up in cases pending/registered with BIFR
(www.bifr.org).
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appropriate amendments in the legal framework affecting the banking sector50. The Committee, in its
Report submitted recently to the Government recommended, among other things, the creation of a new
law granting statutory power of possession and sale of security directly to banks and financial institutions
and creation of a new Securitisation Act, which would be an umbrella act conferring legal sanctity to
transfer of future receivables. It has also suggested the provision of additional avenues of recovery of
dues to banks and financial institutions by empowering them to take possession of securities and sell them
for recovery of loans without the court’s intervention. It is important to note in this context that the co-
operative sector has such a system of taking possession of securities in case of default; such a system has
however, proved to be ineffective. The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Laws has also made several
interim recommendations, including a separate comprehensive Bankruptcy Code to deal with corporate
bankruptcy and institution of a Special Bankruptcy Bench in each High Court, to tackle the problem. It
needs to be reiterated that the legal system be made sufficiently prompt, responsive and efficient to take
care of the problems facing the banking sector.
8. Transparency and Disclosure: In the Indian context, the transparency and disclosure standards have
been enhanced to meet international standards. The range and extent of disclosures has been gradually
increasing over the last couple of years in order to provide a clearer picture of balance sheets to the
financial community. Since March 31, 2000, banks operating in India have been disclosing in their
published accounts information relating to maturity pattern of loans and advances, investment securities,
deposits and borrowings, foreign currency assets and liabilities, movements in NPAs and provisions and
lending to sensitive sectors (capital market sector, real estate sector and commodities sector). The
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed with the Reserve Bank each year has compelled bank
management to adhere to certain minimum performance standards. More so, when banks are raising
capital from the market, they are accountable to the public/shareholders. Such transparency of operations
is essential to minimize informational asymmetry between the regulator and regulated and facilitate
effective monitoring of banks.
Two issues arise in this context. The first relates to the availability of raw source data. Presently,
the majority of the banking data is housed with the RBI and only those data which are released by the
RBI is available to the financial community; all other data are secondary. It needs to be appreciated that
this poses a serious handicap in understanding and analyzing the developments in the banking sector.
49 As against 50-60 judges in High Courts, the Act has provided for only one presiding Officer for each DRT.
50 Banks have been provided with a menu of strategies to restructure bad debts, i.e., recovery drive, Debt Recovery
Tribunals, Lok Adalats, and ARCs. The Reserve Bank has also provided indicative guidelines for compromise
settlement of chronic NPAs in the small-scale sector. Settlement Advisory Committees have also been formed at
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Therefore, in order to impart greater transparency, while the regulatory data, which is confidential in
nature, would need to be kept in abeyance from public domain, all other data could be warehoused
outside, where it would be freely accessible to the public at large. Secondly, while the disclosures
standards have been enhanced, several areas of lacunae still remain, viz., complete breakup of income,
discontinuance of lines of business, entry into newer lines of business, information detailing maturity and
repricing of all assets and liabilities, cumulative provisions as against loan losses with the movement in
provisions account, details of contingent liabilities, details of risk weighted assets, leverage ratio, details
of legal risk, are still not being disclosed. If recent experience is to be believed, the compliance of norms
for transparency often turns out to be 'technical compliance', whereas there is little headway as regards
actual compliance with norms. The recommendations of the Advisory Group on Banking Supervision
(Chairman: Shri M.S.Verma) are pertinent in this regard.
9. Potential Conflicts as Owner/Supervisor: A large part of banking operations in India is accounted for
by PSBs51. The competitive impulses engineered by the RBI in the cause of enhancing efficiency have to
take into account the extent of response of PSBs and the Government as their principal to competitive
pressures. Similarly, the regulatory and prudential considerations advanced by the RBI have to reckon
with the impact on and response of the PSBs and Government as their principal. It is not possible to
ignore the systemic implications of the large sub-system of PSBs52. The RBI is both the owner as well as
the regulator of the State Bank of India (SBI). A transfer of the ownership of SBI to the Government,
more so at a time when there is a general move towards reducing Government presence in the banking
sector might be a retrograde step, since the autonomy which SBI had with its ownership being with the
RBI might get compromised when the same is transferred to the Government. A more practical approach
might be to go for a two-stage solution. In stage 1, a truly independent Board of Directors needs to be
nominated by the RBI. In stage 2, the nominees of RBI needs to be form Trust, where the shares of SBI
can be deposited. Such a move, while allowing greater operational autonomy to SBI will also enable it to
enhance corporate governance.
regional and head office levels. A Credit Information Bureau has been established to co-ordinate sharing of
information among banks and financial institutions.
51 Over the period ending March 1997 through March 2000, PSBs accounted for roughly 80 per cent of total assets
of SCBs.
52 A study by Sarker et al. (1998) finds that private banks may not be unambiguously superior to state-owned banks
(SOBs). While traded private banks are found to be superior to SOBs with regard to both return on assets and
income earning potential (proxied by the ratio of operating profits to average total assets or, the operating profit
ratio) and private banks, as a group were significantly superior with respect to Return on Assets, neither traded nor
non-traded private banks seem to have any comparative advantage with respect to operational efficiency.
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10. Regulation and Supervision: The experience of the Asian crisis reiterated the need for a sound
regulatory and supervisory framework53. The role of supervision, in such a situation, is to promote
financial market stability and minimize systemic risk. In a tightly controlled financial system, it is easier
to isolate and contain a problem, while when the system is being opened up and markets become
integrated, the transmission of problems across markets and territories becomes easier. To counter the
risk, the implementation of risk management practices has to be directed towards not only liberalizing,
but also simultaneously strengthening it. Regulators all over the world are unanimous in their view that
the effectiveness of the financial system is, to a significant extent, molded by the effectiveness of the
regulatory and supervisory structures in which they operate. Normally, systems are devised in anticipation
mode to take care of eventualities that might arise in the foreseeable future. However, while the situations
are dynamic, the systems, which are expected to respond to these situations are at best essentially quasi-
dynamic: they are generally static (Caprio and Honohan, 1999). In order to ensure that the slack between
a situation and the system governing it is smooth and not jerky, it becomes essential to promote prudent
practices. This requires that the supervisors adopt appropriate benchmarks, based on international best
practices. These should be transparent. Above all, the guidance flowing from the supervisory findings has
to gain acceptance from the regulated. This requires that a suitable system of rewards and retribution be
evolved and systematically adhered to.54
There is also a lack of consensus in the literature on whether monetary policy and supervision
should be with the same or with different agencies. One argument given for separation is that combining
these functions within the same agency might lead to conflicts of interests55. Goodhart and Schoenmaker
(1998) argue that, ‘the potential for conflict between regulatory and monetary objectives depends to a
large extent on the structure of the banking and financial systems. The more such a system involves
intermediaries financing maturity mismatch positions through wholesale markets in a competitive milieu,
the greater such dangers of conflict’.56 In line with the recommendations of the NCR-I, the supervisory
function of banks (and other financial institutions) has been hived off to a separate authority as an
53 As Caprio (1998) has observed, deregulation does not imply the absence of regulation, but it means right
regulation.
54 The recent instances of irregularities in the equity market has brought to the fore the need for a super-regulator for
formal coordination of the activities of the multiple regulators. It needs to be recognised that every transaction,
irrespective of the market in which it takes place, has one leg in the cash (inter-bank) market in terms of ultimate
payment and settlement. As a consequence, any problem in that market in which the transaction takes place has an
impact in the cash market. In the co-ordination mechanism suggested in the ‘Reddy formula’, the authority should
be vested with the RBI, since in the ultimate analysis, the central bank is called upon to provide liquidity to the
market in a contingency.
55 For example, in its role as the agency in charge of monetary policy, the central bank might desire to raise interest
rates (to control inflation), but that, on the flip side, might adversely affect the profitability and solvency of the
banking sector (Goodhart, 1995).
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autonomous body under the aegis of the Reserve Bank. In pursuance of the same, the Board for Financial
Supervision (BFS) was constituted in 1994 as a Committee of the Central Board of Directors of the
Reserve Bank to pay 'undivided attention to supervision', with the Governor of the Reserve Bank as the
Chairman and four non-official Directors of the Reserve Bank and the Deputy Governors of the Reserve
Bank as members. However, as echoed in NCR-II, ‘the membership of the Board has been restricted to
the members of the RBI Board, and in effect, the Board functions like a Committee of the RBI Board’
(pp.68, para 7.23). The objective of distancing the actual operations of the Board and its supervisory arm
from the Reserve Bank remains an unresolved issue till date57.
An important issue that has gained currency is the supervision of cooperative banks. It needs to
be recognized that the asset structure of cooperative banks is distinctly different from that of commercial
banks. Apart from the different regulatory authorities involved in their supervision/inspection, the sheer
numbers58 and their dispersed and local character (with a different niche clientele) can affect the regular
programming of inspections by supervisors, given that the supervisory resources are limited. In view of
the above, supervision of UCBs often proves to be a challenging proposition for the Reserve Bank, so that
it might prove worthwhile integrating the supervision of cooperative banks under one umbrella. In this
context, the Monetary and Credit Policy of April 2001 has emphasized the creation of a separate apex
supervisory authority which can take over the entire inspection/supervisory functions in relation to
scheduled and non-scheduled UCBs, with manpower and other assistance to the new supervisory body,
when created. Such a set up might engender a fragmentation of the regulatory framework, and more so,
when UCBs are a part of the payment system. In view of the size diversity and geographical dispersion of
such banks, it is important that regulators develop expertise of ’hands-off’ approach’ to regulation. Such
expertise would also lead to synergies in the supervision of NBFCs, where at present, the regulatory and
supervisory functions are guided more by concerns of protection of depositors interests as opposed to
priority to secured creditors. A study of the regulatory control over NBFCs reveals that it is essentially
liability-centric, with primary concern for depositor protection. It is important in this context that the
56 In their survey of 24 countries, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1998) found that 11 of these had combined agencies,
while the rest had separated ones in the eighties.
57 In this context, the ability to monitor financial sector soundness pre-supposes the existence of valid indicators of
the health and stability of financial systems. These indicators, termed Macro-Prudential Indicators (MPIs) have been
widely used in the literature of late (Owens et al., 2000). MPIs in essence, comprise both aggregated micro-
prudential indicators (AMPIs) of the health of financial institutions and macroeconomic indicators (MEIs)
associated with financial system soundness. Financial crises often occurs when both types of indicators point to
vulnerabilities-that is, both financial institutions are weak and vulnerable to macro-economic shocks. The use of
MPIs to assess financial soundness has been dictated by two major considerations. The first is the responsibility of
supervisors to identify problem banks. The other is to monitor the behaviour of troubled banks in an attempt to
prevent failure or to limit losses.
58 As at end-March 2000, there were as many as 2,084 UCBs, of which 51 are scheduled UCBs and the rest are non-
scheduled.
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regulator is guided by concerns of emergence of a systemic threat and the deposits of the intermediate
sector be treated differently from those of commercial banks, so as to ensure that the growth of this
sector, with its innovative approach in financing, takes place on sound lines (Nayak, 1995).
In the financial sector itself, there are at present three major regulators, RBI, Securities and
Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA). Looking
at the international experience as also the financial structure of India, there seems to be a case for
preserving this multiple regulatory structure, while at the same time strengthening the co-ordination
mechanism. In this context, the Reddy formula seems worth pursuing giving the framework a legal status
(Reddy, 2001c).
11. Universal Banking: Worldwide experience suggests a move towards universal banking on the part of
financial sector participants in terms of a greater integration of operation of banks and non-bank financial
institutions in India. Commercial banks have entered the domain of term-financing and have started
providing investment banking services, besides making their presence in diverse areas like mutual funds,
securities trading and factoring services. With DFIs, in turn, making inroads into traditional banking
activities of short-term/working capital financing, the operational divide between banks and DFIs has
become increasingly blurred. In the light of the recommendations of the Narasimham Committee as well
as the Khan Working Group for Harmonising the Role and Operations of DFIs and Banks (1998), the
Reserve Bank prepared a Discussion Paper which contended that the issue of transformation of a DFI into
a bank should ideally be considered after a reasonable period of time has elapsed; in the interim, DFIs
could tailor their activities to become either a bank or a NBFC, depending on institution-specific
considerations and their comparative advantages. It however needs to be recognized that universal
banking is not a panacea; Rojas Suarez (1997) has documented that the potential systemic effect of a bank
failure could be far greater under universal banking than otherwise.
Several issues would need to be sorted out in the transition towards universal banking becomes
operational. On the liabilities side of the banks’ balance sheets, short-term deposits account for a
substantial share. On the other hand, it is long-term resources that dominate the liability side of a DFI’s
balance sheet, with mobilisation of short/medium-term resources through term-deposits, certificates of
deposits, inter-corporate deposits and term money borrowings, restricted by the umbrella limit in terms of
their net owned funds. In the absence of cash-like assets and the existence of relatively illiquid assets, the
imposition of CRR and SLR would, therefore, prompt the universal banks to resort to large-scale
borrowings. With the CRR and SLR prescriptions currently at 7.5 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively,
the extent of pre-emption would be substantial, thereby limiting the flow of lendable resources to the
productive sectors of the economy. In addition, several other issues like branch network (new banks are
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required to locate at least 25 per cent of their total branches in the semi-urban and rural areas), extension
of deposit insurance, priority sector lending etc., will need to be sorted out before the full transition
towards universal banking. The legal status of some of the financial institutions would need to be altered
in order to bring it under the regulatory ambit of the central bank.
Furthermore, in a situation of universal banking, there could be multiple regulators covering a
single entity, depending on the functions undertaken by it. In such a scenario, the risk of regulatory
arbitrage or competitive concessions might prove overwhelming. This necessitates a mechanism for
coordinating the activities of the multiple regulators in order to impart greater efficacy to ‘function-
specific’ regulation, so that the risk multiplier role of universal banks is, by and large, contained. In other
words, the role of regulation in such circumstances should be to ensure risk mitigation, and not risk
diversification. More importantly, at a time when banks and financial institutions would require higher
levels of capital in the light of the pronouncements in the new Basel Capital Accord, it is possible that the
banking industry might witness mergers and acquisitions to exploit cost benefits (economies of scale,
organisational efficiency, funding costs and risk diversification) or revenue benefits (economies of scope,
enhancing monopoly rents) as financial entities brace to position themselves as universal banks.
12. Risk Management: Given the growing internationalisation of banking operations, there remains the
possibility of a serious mismatch between assets and liabilities with damaging implications for interest
rate risk, liquidity risk, foreign exchange risk etc. Proactive handling of these risks therefore assumes
prime significance. The NCR-II had also addressed this issue and brought into focus the dangers to
liquidity and solvency due to mismatches between assets and liabilities. Apart from the standard set of
risks which are already present, several other kinds of risks, not easily visible to the common observer,
also gain prominence. Some of the salient ones are discussed below.
When an economy is liberalizing, the banking system faces a ’double-whammy’. On one hand,
the banks have to handle changes within the banking system, whereas on the other hand, they have to
confront changes in the client network, which involves an entirely new set of risks. These risks are such
that the client system does not have much maneuverability to hedge against them. Since the banks in India
had, in the regulated era, assumed that these risks would be borne entirely by the clients, they were not
factored them into account while determining the risk-reward structure or pricing strategy.
Another source of problem is that of technology risk. With a significant workforce, the PSBs
have not been able to harness the beneficial effects of computerisation. Information technology is viewed
more as a reconciliation equipment for the back office and a ledger mechanism for the front office. This,
in effect, constrains PSBs from providing a single window service to their customers in a world where
banking is increasingly becoming a consumer-centric service provider. This lack of leveraging of their
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investment in effect has inhibited their decision-support system, which is a growing threat they encounter
from their private sector and foreign counterparts. PSBs have remained a dominant segment of the
financial marketplace in India, with a considerable amount of social and economic investment into them.
It is important for them to wake up to the realities of the changing scenario and pro-actively handle these
risks.
On the operational front, two issues emerge. One, the Board of Directors of a bank is enjoined to
consider and approve models for risk identification, measurement and management. The constitution of
the Board of PSBs is often such that decisions on the risk management techniques is outside their core
competence. Even within the bank’s administrative structure, the necessary expertise might not be readily
available. Urgent steps are called for to strengthen the Board as also the technical skills of the bank
personnel. The second is the non-availability and lack of credibility of the data. Data availability and
integrity decide the effectiveness of risk management decisions. The situation in this area would need to
be improved if banks are to equip themselves to proactively deal with the changes in the operating
environment.
As regards off-balance sheet activities of PSBs, these seem to be quite limited at present. The
Indian banking system is yet to develop the necessary expertise to handle complicated derivative products
and hedge the risks that flow from there; in the foreseeable future, however, the banking system would
need to exercise great degree of caution in the use of such instruments.
13. Capital Account Liberalisation: In India, the link between the forward premia and the interest rate
differential seems to work roughly through leads and lags. Importers and exporters do influence the
forward markets through availment of /grant of credit to overseas parties. With the opening of the capital
account, the forward premia is getting aligned with the interest rate differential. However, the fact
remains that free movement in the capital account is only a necessary condition for full development of
forward and other forex derivatives market. The sufficient condition is provided by a deep and liquid
money market with a well-defined yield curve in place. Developing a well integrated, consistent and
meaningful yield curve requires considerable market development in terms of both volume and liquidity
in various time and market segments. No doubt, the integration between domestic and overseas market
operates more often through the forward market. This integration has been facilitated by allowing
Authorised Dealers to borrow from their overseas offices/correspondents and invest funds in overseas
money market to the same amount.59
59 The Union Budget 2001-02 provided an impetus towards Capital Account Liberalisation by permitting (1) Indian
companies to invest abroad to the tune of US $ 50 million on an annual basis; (2) companies which have made
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Several issues arise in this regard. First, liberalization of the capital account provides a new
source of liquidity for banks. The question arises as to how well are banks geared up to face this
challenge. Second, access to external capital impacts the business of banks since corporates have access
to a wider choice regarding the quantum, rate and denomination in which to raise resources and therefore
the cost of domestic capital assumes primacy. This also has an impact on the credit portfolio of banks.
Thirdly, as it stands at present, overseas branches of Indian banks act as a conduit for domestic corporates
to park their funds (ADRs/GDRs)/borrowal accounts, which would not be required once capital account
liberalization becomes a reality. A re-positioning of such branches would, therefore, be in order. Finally,
with the advent of universal banking practices amidst capital account liberalization, financial
conglomerates would be looking for cheapest way to raise funds, of which foreign capital would be one
such. Such massive inflow and outflow of resources might engender serious systemic risks, which would
necessitate greater vigilance on the part of the regulatory authorities to ensure that such activities are risk
mitigating and not risk multiplying.
14. Corporate Governance: In a democratic polity, reforms by itself might not make much sense, unless
they are fortified with strong corporate governance practices. Corporate governance acts a 'coping
mechanism' in order to enable the participants reap the full benefits of reforms. As it stands at present,
banks and financial institutions are covered by the SBI Act, Banking Regulation Act, IDBI Act, Bank
Nationalisation Act, RBI Act and the Companies Act. The employees of the nationalised banks and SBI
are covered by the Bank Nationalisation Act or SBI Act as against those of private sector banks, who are
governed by the Companies Act. Consequently, the employees of PSBs are treated as public servants and
are within the jurisdiction of the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)/Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI), which does not cover employees of private sector banks, thereby hampering the decision-making
process of such entities. Corporate governance in banks is essential towards creation of a ‘level-playing
field’ in respect of the legal framework governing their operations.
The rights of the private shareholders of SBI/nationalised banks are also abridged very
considerably. Presently, they are denied such basic rights as adoption of annual accounts or approving
dividends. They can neither influence the composition of the Board, or the compensation package or even
the selection of statutory auditors of banks. Preferential treatment is accorded to the Government nominee
for determining the quorum of an Annual General Meeting of the PSBs. One therefore clearly experiences
the lack of shareholder democracy. In the private sector banks likewise, the voting rights of individual
ADR/GDR issues to make foreign investments upto 100 per cent of the proceeds, (3) Indian companies which have
issued ADR/GDRs to acquire shares of foreign companies to the tune of US $ 100 million.
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shareholders is restricted to not more than 10 per cent of bank's equity, even if they own more than 10 per
cent of equity.
The Board of Directors of PSBs also needs to be given attention from another angle. Since
Directors are nominated by the Government, it assumes a degree of political patronage and at times,
reconstitution of Board becomes a difficult balancing act. Besides, representation is given to various
socio-economic interest groups on the Boards of banks. Such an arrangement might well have outlived its
utility, post-reforms. Hence, a major reform in the constitution, functioning and the autonomy of the bank
Boards is urgently called for. As Tarapore (2000) has observed, ‘the real challenge in the Indian system is
not merely how quickly banks migrate out of the public sector but how banks are governed in an optimal
manner’.
15. Deposit Insurance: Another issue is that of deposit insurance. Historically, deposit insurance has
been linked to bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). To prevent runs and its contagion effect, it was
deemed as essential to insure depositors by an entity of unquestioned creditworthiness (which probably
means in practice an agency of the Government). Such a mechanism seeks to ensure that sudden
withdrawals do not lead to widespread financial panics. Following the experience of the Great Depression
when there was a widespread loss of confidence in banks and one-third of the institutions failed, deposit
insurance was introduced in the U.S. in the form of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to
avoid a repetition of such eventualities.
In India, as it exists at present, the deposit insurance premia is generally a flat rate, irrespective of
the risk profile of the financial entity. This creates a moral hazard problem in that depositors have limited
incentive to monitor the condition of the financial institution. This has raised the obvious question as to
whether the premia should be risk-based which raises issues, such as the basis of assessment of risk
profile of banks. The literature points to FDIC model of supervisory rating (CAMELS), risk-adjusted
assets basis and options pricing model. There is also an question of whether the onus of monitoring the
bank falls on the Deposit Insurance Corporation and whether it should be conferred legal status to take
penal action including liquidation. Moving to such a system at this stage would discriminate against the
existing weak banks and place their restructuring efforts under greater difficulty. Another issue relates to
the size of deposit that is insured. Many of these problems involved in the transition have been discussed
in the Report on Reforms in Deposit Insurance in India (1999). From the legal standpoint, the scope of
revision of the present deposit insurance setup has to deal with a number of legal amendments. Several
enactments, including the Bank Nationalisation Act and the State enactments on cooperatives present
hurdles in the deposit insurance corporation acting as receiver/liquidator in the case of failure of insured
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entity.60 These issues would need to be sorted out before the move towards a revised deposit insurance
scheme, which is being contemplated, is effected.
16. Issues relating to Cooperative Banking: Urban cooperative banks (UCBs) have come to constitute
an important segment of the financial system. Over the period from 1992-93 to 1999-00, the number of
reporting banks have increased from 1,399 to 2,050 with their owned funds increasing more than three-
fold from Rs.22 billion to over Rs.80 billion over this period. Even their profitability has improved
significantly over the period, with net profits increasing from Rs. 0.86 billion in 1997-98 (0.46 per cent of
total assets) to Rs. 2.55 billion (0.86 per cent of total assets) in 1999-00.
Despite the healthy growth of UCBs, there are several issues that remains to be resolved. First, in
the new liberalised regime, licensing policy for new UCBs is expected to be not only transparent, but also
objective, based on established standards and procedures. Moreover, the procedures governing these
licensing norms have to be simple and minimal. In connection with the above, the Madhava Rao
Committee (1999) enunciated a two-fold licensing criteria, depending on the capital base of the bank and
the credibility of the promoter. As it stands at present, the entry point norms (EPN) for UCBs are
extremely low and not in consonance with the principles of sound banking. While the entry point norms
for new private sector banks are placed at Rs.2 billion, that for UCBs have varied anywhere between
Rs.10-75 lakh (recommended at Rs.50-500 lakh by the Madhava Rao Committee), depending on the
population strata and initial membership. At a time when UCBs are part of the payment system, any
weakness in cooperative banking sector is expected to have serious repercussions on the rest of the
financial system, necessitating high bail-out costs. There is a need to rethink the present EPNs for UCBs.
Second, one of the major problem areas in the supervision of UCBs is the duality in control by the State
Government and the Reserve Bank. Since UCBs are primarily credit institutions meant to be run on
commercial lines, the responsibility for their supervision devolves on the Reserve Bank, as they constitute
a part of the payment system. Therefore, while the banking operations pertaining to branch licensing,
expansion of areas of operations, interest fixation on deposits and advances, audit and investments are
under the jurisdiction of RBI, the managerial aspects of these banks relating to registration, constitution of
management, administration and recruitment, are controlled by the State Governments under the
provisions of the respective State Cooperative Societies Act. The NCR-II recommended that this duality
of control be done away with and the responsibility of regulation of UCBs be placed on the Board for
Financial Supervision. This will require amendments of the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 1984,
60 The Banking Regulation Act deals with suspension of business and winding up of banking companies. In case of
SBI and its subsidiaries, only the Central Government is competent to order for liquidation of these entities. In case
of RRBs, the Central Government is empowered to order their liquidation.
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State Cooperative Societies Act, and the Banking Regulation Act, which would need to be sorted out.
Third, the NCR-II had raised the issue of extending capital adequacy prescription for cooperative banks.
In the words of the Committee “capital adequacy prescription to the [rural financing institutions] is
important to develop a sound and healthy rural financial system”(pp.61). Accordingly, the Committee
recommended that the cooperative banks should reach a minimum 8 per cent CRAR over a period of five
years. The findings of the Madhava Rao Committee on UCBs also reiterated that the majority of the
UCBs was in favour of extending the CRAR discipline to UCBs. However, the ability of the UCBs to
raise additional capital for the purpose has been limited by certain features viz., inability to make public
issue of capital and that, they can raise capital only from members, the fact that members can redeem their
share in the capital, subject to an overall ceiling and restrictions imposed by the various Acts (State
Cooperative Societies Act and Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 1984) which constrains the number
of shares that an individual can hold. In view of the above, it is suggested that scheduled UCBs be
brought under the ambit of the CRAR discipline in phased manner61. Finally, the existence of a large
number of unlicensed banks has become a serious cause for concern to regulators. The main reason for
proliferation of such banks has been the statute induced expansion, so that under Section 5(ccv), a
primary credit society with a paid up capital of a minimum of Rs. 1 lakh and carrying out banking
business automatically secures an UCB status. In view of the regulatory discomfiture that such banks
impose on the system as a whole, the Madhava Rao Committee (1999) had suggested that these banks be
licensed provided they satisfy the quadruple criteria of (a) minimum prescribed CRAR, (b) net NPA ratio
not exceeding 10 per cent, (c) have made profits continually for the last three years, and (d) have
complied with the RBI regulatory directions. These would need to be examined before making any
decision on licensing of UCBs. It needs to be appreciated that every transaction, irrespective of the market
in which it takes place, has one leg in the cash/inter-bank market in terms of ultimate payment/settlement.
Any problem in the market in which the transaction takes place has to impact the cash market. The
Reserve Bank as the ultimate provider of liquidity has, therefore, to concern itself with the stability in the
functioning of all financial markets (Reddy, 2001c). Since the co-operatives banks are part of the
payment system, they need to be regulated in the same manner as banks. A two-tier approach to
regulation - those being part of the payment system being regulated under one umbrella; those who
are not part of the payment system are regulated separately, might prove useful in this regard.
61 For non-scheduled UCBs, the CRAR has been fixed at 6 per cent as on March 31, 2001. This has been raised
subsequently to 7 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively, effective March 31, 2002 and March 31, 2003, respectively.
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V. Concluding Remarks
To syncopate, the reform process cannot be entirely painless. While there are achievements, there
are setbacks as well. What is important is to strike a balance: tread a careful middle path between the ex-
cathedra overzeal for intervention and a complacent belief in the ability of the banking system to self-
rectify its deficiencies. This is because, in an ideal world, there is always a smattering of small
disturbances every year or two to keep the authorities on their toes. The real world, however, is often far
divorced from idealism: long periods of tranquility with little or no financial disturbance, engender a
sense of complacency which eventually culminate in periods of turmoil which contain several failures and
the threat of many more. A constant challenge therefore remains for the authorities in identifying newer
risks, eschewing harmful incentives and strengthening the banking sector to keep pace with changes in
financial technology. This is also reflected in NCR-II wherein they observe 'with improved strengths and
structural changes and with greater functional autonomy and operational flexibility, there is every reason
to expect that [our] banking system will rise to the challenges of the next millennium'. Vigil is the eternal
price of freedom, which includes economic freedom as well.
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AMC: Asset Management Company
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ARF: Asset Reconstruction Fund
BFS: Board for Financial Supervision
BIFR: Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction
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Table 1: Composition of Gross Domestic Saving
(as percentage of GDP at market prices)
Item 1970-71
to
1974-75
1980-81
to
1984-85
1990-91 1995-96 1999-2000
1 2 3 4 5 6
I. Household Sector 12.0 14.1 19.3 18.1 19.8
I.1 Financial Saving 4.0 6.7 8.7 8.9 10.5
Of which a
Bank Deposits 42.9 41.9 31.8 29.1 33.7
Claims on Government 2.4 10.5 13.5 7.9 12.2
Currency 15.2 12.3 10.6 13.8 8.9
Shares and Debentures 1.1 3.4 8.4 6.5 6.3
Life Insurance Fund 10.2 7.3 9.5 11.6 11.4
II. Private Corporate Sector 1.7 1.6 2.7 4.9 3.7
III. Public Sector 3.0 3.7 1.1 2.0 -1.2
IV. Gross Domestic Saving 16.6 19.4 23.1 25.1 22.3
a: as percent of financial saving
Source: Central Statistical Organisation and Reserve Bank of India.
Table 2: Indicators of Banking Policy: 1970-2001
(Selected Years)
Year Bank Rate Deposit Rate (1 year)
(% per annum)
Loan Ceiling Ratea
Loan Minimum Ratea
(% per annum)
CRR
(% of NDTL)
SLR
(% of NDTL)
1 2 3 4 5 6
1974 9.0 (July) 8.0 (Dec.) 16.5 (Mar 1976) 4.0 33.0 (July)
1981 10.0 (July) 7.5 (Dec.) 19.5 (March) 7.5 35.0 (October)
1987 -- 9.0 (October) 16.5 (April) 10 (October) 37.5 (April)
1991 12.0 (October) 10.0 (July)
12.0 (October)
19.0 (April) 15.0 (May) 38.5
(September, 1990)
1994 -- <10 14.0 (March)
Free (October)
15.0 (August) 31.5 (October)
1997 9.0 (October) Free Free 10 (December) 25.0b (October)
1999 8.0 (March) Free Free 9.0 (November) 25.0
2000 8.0 (July) Free Free 8.5 (August) 25.0
2001 7.0 (March) Free Free 8.0 (March)
7.5 (May)
25.0
a. Effective October 1988, ceiling rate abolished and minimum rate imposed.
b. Minimum as under Section 24 of the BR Act, 1949.
Figures in brackets under Column (4) and (5) indicate the effective date.
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
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Table 3: Indicators of Financial Development
Period/Year Finance Ratio
(FR)
Financial Inter-
relations Ratio
(FIR)
New Issue Ratio
(NIR)
Intermediation Ratio
(IR)
1 2 3 4 5
1970-71 to 1974-75 0.168 1.379 0.788 0.770
1980-81 to 1984-85 0.344 2.421 1.429 0.690
1990-91 0.401 1.745 1.005 0.736
1993-94 0.473 2.825 1.489 0.898
1995-96 0.493 2.260 1.328 0.702
FR=Total Assets/National Income; FIR=Total Issues/Net Domestic Capital Formation
NIR=Primary Issues/ Net Domestic Capital Formation
IR=Secondary Issues (i.e., issuers by banks and financial institutions)/ Primary Issues
National Income=Net National Product at factor cost at current prices (1980-81 series)
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
Table 4: Capital Restructuring of Nationalised Banks (Rs. crore)
Bank 1993-
94
1994-95 1995-
96
1996-
97
1997-
98
1998-
99
Capital
Returned to
GoI.
Tier-I Tier-II Total
Allahabad Bank 90.0 356.2 101.61 457.81 160.0
Andhra Bank 150.0 184.32 0.00 184.32 165.0
Bank of Baroda 400.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 381.0
Bank of India 635.0 848.38 348.22 1196.60 93.47
BoM 150.0 334.19 0.00 334.19 80.0
Canara Bank 365.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 600.0
CBI 490.0 632.46 0.00 632.46 500.0
Corporation
Bank
45.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 30.0
Dena Bank 130.0 6.11 72.28 78.39
Indian Bank 220.0 230.96 180.94 411.90 1750.0 100.0
IOB 705.0 258.60 132.74 391.34
OBC 50.0 0.00 0.00 0.00
P&S 160.0 116.03 0.00 116.03 72.0 150.0
PNB 415.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 138.33
Syndicate Bank 680.0 278.59 88.79 367.38 172.0
UCO Bank 535.0 515.52 0.00 515.52 110.0 54.0 350.0 200.0
Union Bank of
India
200.0 0.00 0.00 0.00
UBI 215.0 538.87 0.00 538.87 256.0 338.0 100.0
Vijaya Bank 200.0 62.31 0.00 62.31 302.0
Total 5700 4362.54 924.58 5287.12 850 1509 2700 400 642.80
BoM: Bank of Maharashtra; CBI: Central Bank of India; IOB: Indian Overseas Bank; OBC: Oriental Bank of
Commerce; P&S: Punjab and Sind Bank; PNB: Punjab National Bank; UBI: United Bank of India.
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
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Table 5: Details of Public Equities by Public Sector Banks:1993-2000
(Amount in Rs.crore)
Size of the Public Issue Equity after
public issue
Post Issue ShareholdingName of the Bank
Date of Issue
Equity Capital
before public
Issue
Equity Premium Total GoI/RBI Others
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
State Bank of India
December 1993
200.00 274.00 1938.17
(Rs.90 per share)
2212.17 474.00 314.34 (66.3) 159.67 (43.7)
State Bank of India (GDR)
October 1996
474.00 52.28 1218.12
(Rs.233 per
share)
1270.40 526.28 314.34 (59.7) 211.94 (40.1)
State Bank of Bikaner &
Jaipur - November 1997
36.40 13.60 59.84
(Rs.440 per
share)
73.44 50.00 37.5 (75.0) 12.5 (25.0)
Oriental Bank of Commerce
October 1994
128.00 60.00 300.00
(Rs.50 per share)
360.00 192.54 128.0 (66.5) 64.54 (33.5)
Dena Bank
December 1996
146.82 60.00 120.01
(Rs.20 per share)
180.01 206.82 146.82 (71.0) 60.0 (29.0)
Bank of Baroda
December 1996
196.00 100.00 750.00
(Rs.75 per share)
850.00 296.00 196.0 (66.9) 100.0 (29.1)
Bank of India
February 1997
489.00 150.00 525.00
(Rs.35 per share)
675.00 639.00 489.0 (77.0) 150.0 (23.0)
Corporation Bank
October 1997
82.00 38.00 266.00
(Rs.70 per share)
304.00 120.00 82.0 (68.3) 38.0 (31.7)
State Bank of Travancore
January 1998
35.00 15.00 75.00
(Rs.500 per
share)
90.00 50.00 38.0 (76.0) 12.0 (24.0)
Syndicate Bank
October 1999
346.97 125.00 (Rs. 10 per
share)
125.00 471.97 346.97 (73.5) 125.0 (26.5)
Andhra Bank
February 2001
347.95 150.00 (Rs. 10 per
share)
150.00 450.00 299.98 (66.6) 150.03 (33.4)
Vijaya Bank
December 2000
259.24 100.00 (Rs. 10 per
share)
100.00 359.24 259.24 (72.2) 100.0 (27.8)
Figures in brackets indicate percentage shareholding.
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
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Table 6: Changes in the Regulatory Framework
Variable/ Year 1992-
93
1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
CRAR
(per cent of RWA)
Domestic Banks with
International Business
* 8 8 8 8 8 8 9
Other Domestic Banks 4 4 4 8 8 8 8 9
Foreign Banks 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9
NPA (period overdue in
quarters)
Sub-standard Assets@ 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
Doubtful Assets 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8#
Provisioning
Requirements (%)
Standard Assets -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.25
Sub-standard Assets 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Doubtful Assets
(Secured Portion)
20-50 20-50 20-50 20-50 20-50 20-50 20-50 20-50
Doubtful Assets
(Unsecured Portion)
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Loss Assets 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Mark to Market $ 30 30 30 40 50 60 70 75
* To achieve 8 per cent as early as possible and in any case, before end-March 1994.
The concept of past due (grace period of 30 days) was dispensed with effective April 1, 2001.
# Reduced to 6 quarters effective March 31,2001; reduced to 2 quarters effective March 31, 2004.
$ Revised valuation norms for banks announced in the Monetary and Credit Policy of October 2000. According to the
guidelines, banks have been permitted to hold a maximum of 25 per cent of their investment in Government securities
under ‘Held to Maturity’ category, which need not be marked to market.
@ Reduced to one quarter effective March 31, 2004.
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
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Table 7: Provisioning Requirements for Non-performing Loans
(as percent of original loan value)
Country Performing Sub-standard Doubtful Loss
Asia
China General: 1 -- -- --
Hong Kong 20 50 100
Indonesia General: 1
Special Mention: 5
15 50 100
Korea Normal: 0.5
Precautionary: 2
20 75 100
Malaysia General: 1.5 20 50 100
Singapore 10 (of unsecured
portion)
50 100
Thailand Pass: 1
Special Mention: 2
25 50 100
Latin America
Argentina 25
Brazil 20 (Coll.)
50 (not Coll.)
50 (Coll.)
100 (not Coll.)
100
Chile Potential Risk: 1
Expected Loss: 20
60 90 100
Mexico Low Risk: 1 20 (Medium Risk) 60 (High Risk) 100 (Irrecoverable)
Transition
Economies
Czech Republic Watch: 5 20 50 100
Hungary Watch: 0-10 11-30 31-70 71-100
Poland 20 50 100
Coll. Collateralised
Source: Hawkins and Turner (1999).
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Table 8: Spreads and Profitability of Banking Sector (percentage of assets)
Variable / Year PSBs Private Sector Banks Foreign Banks SCBs
1 2 3 4 5 6
1993-94 Old New
Interest Income 8.57 8.93 -- 10.00 8.70
Interest Expense 6.21 5.89 -- 5.80 6.16
Spread 2.36 3.04 -- 4.20 1.54
Non-Interest Income --
Operating Expense 2.65 2.45 -- 2.65 2.64
Operating Profit 0.99 1.89 -- 3.78 1.25
Provisions 2.14 1.24 -- 2.06 2.09
Net Profits -1.15 0.65 -- 1.72 -0.83
1996-97
Interest Income 9.69 10.65 10.14 11.08 9.88
Interest Expense 6.53 7.72 7.26 6.95 6.66
Spread 3.16 2.93 2.88 4.13 3.22
Non-Interest Income 1.32 1.48 2.03 2.49 1.45
Operating Expense 2.88 2.52 1.94 3.00 2.85
Operating Profit 1.60 1.89 2.98 3.62 1.82
Provisions 1.03 0.98 1.24 2.44 1.15
Net Profits 0.57 0.91 1.76 1.19 0.67
1999-2000
Interest Income 8.92 9.58 7.53 9.87 8.96
Interest Expense 6.22 7.24 5.65 6.02 6.24
Spread 2.70 2.33 1.87 3.85 2.72
Non-Interest Income 1.28 1.68 1.66 2.60 1.43
Operating Expense 2.52 2.18 1.42 3.21 2.49
Operating Profit 1.47 1.84 2.11 3.24 1.66
Provisions 0.89 1.00 1.15 2.07 1.00
Net Profits 0.57 0.84 0.97 1.17 0.66
Spread is the difference between interest income and interest expense.
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
Table 9: Non-Performing Assets of Public Sector Banks
End-March NPAs
(Rs. billion)
Gross NPAs as
percent of
Advances
Gross NPAs as
percent of Assets
Net NPAs
as percent of
Advances
Net NPAs
as percent of
Assets
1 2 3 4 5 6
1993 392.5 23.2 11.8
1994 410.4 24.8 10.8
1995 383.8 19.5 8.7 10.7 4.0
1996 416.6 18.0 8.2 8.9 3.6
1997 435.8 17.8 7.8 9.2 3.6
1998 456.5 16.0 7.0 8.2 3.3
1999 517.1 15.9 6.7 8.1 3.1
2000 532.9 14.0 6.0 7.4 2.9
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
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Table 10: Stress Test of Credit Risk- Public Sector Banks
(Rs. billion)
Scenarios
I II
Year/ Item March 1999 Post-Shock Post-Shock
Standard Loans 3407.1 2964.2 3236.8
Non-Performing Loans 517.1 960.0 687.5
Loan Loss Provisions 277.3 321.6 336.9
Additional Provisioning -- 44.3 59.6
Loss of Interest Income -- 55.4 21.3
Total Capital* 345.3 301.0 285.7
Risk Weighted Assets 3122.4 3078.1 3062.7
CRAR (per cent) 11.1 9.8 9.3
(as per cent of assets)$
Standard Loans 35.8 31.2 34.0
Non-Performing Loans 5.4 10.1 7.2
Loan Loss Provisions 2.9 3.4 3.5
Additional Provisioning -- 0.5 0.6
Loss of Interest Income -- 0.6 0.2
Total Capital 3.6 3.2 3.0
Risk Weighted Assets 32.8 32.6 32.2
$ As per cent of assets of Scheduled Commercial Banks (excluding Regional Rural Banks) as at end-March 1999.
Scenario 1: NPAs grow at 13 per cent. Average interest rate on loans is 12.5 per cent. Provisions made at 10 per cent
for loans becoming sub-standard.
Scenario 2: NPAs grow at 5 per cent. Average interest rate on loans is 12.5 per cent. Provisions made at 35 per cent for
loans becoming sub-standard.
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Table 3: Progress of Commercial Banking in India
Indicators June
1969
December
1980
March
1991
March
1995
March
2000
1 2 3 4 5 6
No. of SCBs 73 154 272 281 297
No. of Bk. Offices 8262 34594 60570 64234 67339
Of which
Bk. Offices in rural and
semi-urban areas
5175 23227 46115 46602 47334
Population per Office
('000s)
64 16 14 15 15
Deposits of SCBs
(Rs. billion)
46.5 404.4 2011.9 3868.6 8515.9
Per capita Deposit (Rs.) 88 738 2368 4242 8247
Credit of SCBs
(Rs. billion)
35.9 250.8 1218.7 2115.6 4540.7
Per capita Credit (Rs.) 68 457 1434 2320 4705
Share of Priority Sector
Advances in Total Non-
Food Credit of SCBs (%)
15.0 40.3 39.2 35.8 35.9*
Deposits (% of National
Income)
15.5 36 48.1 46.4 48.7*
Total Assets (Rs. billion) 68.4 710.8 3275.2 5215.4 11516.2
*as at end-March 1999.
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
Table 11: Indicators of External Debt Sustainability
Year Total External
Debt
(Rs. billion)
CAD
(% of GDP)
Debt Service
Ratio
Reserves
(months of imports)
Short-term
Debt/Total Debt
(%)
1 2 3 4 5 6
1990-91 1630.0 (10.3) 3.2 35.3 2.7 10.2
1994-95 3116.8 (4.3) 1.1 26.2 8.5 4.3
1997-98 3696.8 (5.4) 1.3 19.0 6.9 5.4
1998-99 4145.9 (4.5) 1.0 18.0 8.2 4.5
1999-2000 4292.7 (4.1) 0.9 16.0 8.2 4.1
Figures in brackets indicate percentage of short-term debt to total external debt.
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
Table 12: Foreign Investment Inflows and Foreign Exchange Reserves
(US $ million)
Year Direct Portfolio Reserves
1 2 3 4
1994-95 1,314 3,824 25,186
1997-98 3,557 1,828 29,367
1998-99 2,462 -61 32,490
1999-2000 2,155 3,026 38,036
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
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Monetary Policy and Financial Markets :  Recent Initiatives* 
 
 
Monetary Policy Instruments /Target / Operating Procedures 
Focus : Movement to indirect instruments & better targetting 
 
Pre-Reform  1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 
• CRR (15%) 
and SLR 
(38.5%) were 
the principal 
instruments 
of monetary 
policy. 
• Segmented 
refinance 
with fixed 
quantum of 
funds 
available at 
fixed rates of 
interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• SLR rationalized 
to 25 per cent 
• Reduction in 
CRR had 
commenced. 
Intention to 
reduce CRR to 
10% in two 
stages 
announced. 
• Segmented 
refinance still 
available 
• M3 was the main 
intermediate 
target. 
• OMO emerging 
as important 
instrument 
• Reactivation of  
Bank Rate 
• Cash Reserve 
Ratio (interest on 
CRR given at 4 
%)reduced to 
10% 
• SLR rationalised 
to uniform 25% 
• General 
Refinance to 
banks plus 
• Liquidity 
Support to PDs 
(pre-determined 
amount and rate) 
 
• Flexibility in use 
of short-term repo 
rate (fixed or 
auction rate, as 
appropriate) 
• CRR continues to 
be an important 
tool 
• Continuation of 
refinance in same 
form 
• Multiple Indicator 
Approach  
• CRR, OMO, 
and Repos are 
important 
tools. 
• ILAF (General 
Refinance to 
banks 
withdrawn) 
• CRR, OMO and 
Repo important 
instruments. 
• Two-Way 
Quotes in T-
Bills (exclusive 
to PDs) 
• CRR  
• First Phase of 
LAF from June 
5, 2000. Daily 
repo and 
reverse repo 
auctions by RBI 
to give liquidity 
and interest rate 
signals. 
• Legal 
Amendments 
for greater 
flexibility in 
• Transition to 
phasea 2 and 3 
of LAF 
announced. 
Standing 
facility 
available to 
system and 
introduction of 
backstop 
facility.  
• Intention to 
announce fixed 
rate repos if 
interest rate 
signals are 
warranted. 
• Changes in 
operational 
procedures of 
LAF . 
  54
 
 
 
monetary policy 
proposed. 
 
• Progress 
towards 
separation of 
monetary and 
debt 
management  
• Interest on 
CRR increased 
to 6 %. 
 
 
Money Market 
Focus : To 
make 
transmission 
mechanism of 
monetary policy 
more efficient 
•   •  •    
• Only banks 
and FIs were 
participants 
in call money 
market 
• CRR/SLR on 
interbank 
liabilities 
• Prior 
permission of 
RBI required 
• PDs allowed as 
borrowers and 
lenders in call 
money market 
• Mutual funds 
permitted to lend 
and corporates 
permitted to 
route lending 
through PDs. 
• Term money 
• Increasing the 
eligible 
instruments for 
repo to cover all 
dated securities 
and T-Bills 
• T-Bills of 
varying 
maturities 
introduced 
• Permitting non-
• Reduction in 
minimum lock in 
period for 
CDs/MMMFs 
• Intention to make 
call money 
market purely 
interbank 
including PDs 
• Permit non-
banks/FIs two-
way access in 
repo market 
• MMMFs under 
regulation of 
SEBI 
• Cheque writing 
facility for 
MMMFs 
 
• Further 
Flexibility in 
use of FRA/IRS 
• Reduced 
minimum 
maturity of CDs 
• Extended 
Period of 
facility of 
routing of call 
money 
• Timetable for 
phasing out of 
non-bank 
participants 
from inter-
bank call 
money market 
announced. 
• Banks/PD/
FIs/ SDs 
directed to 
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for CP 
• CP carved 
out of 
working 
capital limits 
• Large 
minimum 
size and 
minimum 
maturity of 3 
months for 
CP 
• MMMFs did 
not exist 
• CDs issued 
only by 
commercial 
banks on 
slightly 
inflexible 
terms 
 
 
 
 
Government 
Securities 
Market 
Focus : 
borrowing 
permitted for 
FIs. 
• Improved terms 
for issuance of 
CP and CD 
• MMMFs in 
operation 
 
 
banks as lenders 
in repo market 
• Extending 
facility of 
routing in call 
money market to 
all  PDs  
• Reduction in 
minimum size of 
CD  
• Cheque writing 
facility for 
Gilts 
• Introduced 
FRA/IRS 
 
  
transactions 
through PDs up 
to end-
December 
2000. 
• Steps being 
taken to extend 
repo facility to 
all such entities 
through SGL II 
Accounts.  
• Work  being 
carried on with 
regard to RTGS 
and Securities 
Clearing 
Corporation 
• New norms 
for  CP 
announced. 
CP emerges 
as a 
standalone 
instrument. 
• Working 
Group on 
Bills 
Discounting 
 
invest in 
CP only in 
demat 
form. 
• Exemption 
to inter-
bank term 
money 
liabilities 
of 
maturities 
of 15 days 
from 
minimum 
CRR 
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Increasing the 
depth and 
liquidity by 
continuing to 
bring about 
improvements 
in the 
instruments, 
institutions and 
operational 
efficiency in the 
market as also 
to establish a 
strong legal and 
regulatory 
framework 
conducive to 
technological 
innovations  
 
 
 
 
• Absence of 
internal debt 
management 
policy 
• Automatic 
monetisation 
of fiscal 
deficit at 
4.6% 
• Active Debt 
management 
policy in 
operation 
• Abolition of 
System of Ad-
Hoc T-Bills from 
April 1, 1997 
• Auction System 
• Uniform price 
Auction for 91-
Day T-Bills 
• Notified 
Amounts in all 
T-Bills Auctions 
• Non-
Competitive 
bides to be kept 
• Reintroduction of 
182 day T-Bills 
• FII entry in T-
Bills market 
 
• Increased Role 
for PDs (100 
% 
underwriting) 
• Decision to 
issue loans on 
price basis to 
facilitate 
consolidation 
• SCRA 
Amendment 
• Special Facility 
for Securities 
Settlement 
• Withdrawal of 
Commission 
payment to 
PDs for T-Bills 
• In-principle 
agreement for 
separation of 
monetary and 
debt 
management 
functions. 
• Intention to 
adopt uniform 
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• System of 
Tap Treasury 
Bills at 4.6% 
• Long dated 
Securities at 
pre-
determined 
coupon rates 
• 182-Day T-
Bills 
• No 
specialized 
institutional 
structure 
 
 
 
 
Deposit / 
Lending Rates 
Focus : 
Complete 
deregulation of 
deposit and 
lending rates 
and flexibility in 
interest rate 
structure 
for issuance of 
Government 
Securities 
• System of PDs in 
place 
• STCI in 
operation 
• Variety of 
Instruments 
 
 
outside notified 
amount 
• FIIs entry in G-
Sec market made 
more flexible 
• Repos in PSU 
bonds/private 
corporate debt in 
demat form 
through 
recognised stock 
exchanges 
 
and pave way 
for STRIPS 
• Calendar for T-
Bills 
 
• Introduction of 
Capital 
Adequacy for 
PDs 
• Announcement 
of Intention for 
Debt Securities 
Clearing 
Corporation 
announced  
• Government 
Securities Act 
in anvil 
• Work relating 
to RTGS in 
progress  
• Work relating 
to Negotiated 
Dealing System 
in progress 
• Efforts to retail 
Government 
Securities 
• Securities 
Clearing 
Corporation 
being operation-
alised 
 
price auction 
for Dated 
Securities. 
• 14- and 182-
Day T-Bills 
discontinued. 
91 and 364 day 
T-Bills exist. 
• Liquidity 
Support for 
PDs 
discontinued.  
• Non-
competitive 
Bids through 
PDs/SDs to 
encourage 
retailing. 
• Clearing 
Corporation 
and  electronic 
Negotiated 
Dealing system 
to be 
established by 
June 2001. 
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• Administered 
interest rate 
structure for 
all categories 
of deposits 
and lending 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prudential 
Norms 
Maintain   
stability in  the 
system and 
bring all 
prudential and 
regulatory 
norms on par 
with 
international 
• Banks given 
freedom to fix 
deposit rates of 
maturity 30 days 
and above 
• Rationalisation 
of lending rates 
from 6 
categories to two 
categories 
• Banks given 
freedom to fix 
their PLR to 
deposits above 
Rs.2 lakh. 
• Further  
Deregulation of 
term deposit 
rates 
• Progressive 
Deregulation of 
lending rates 
• Introduction of 
TPLR 
• Participation in 
Consortium non-
obligatory 
• Loan system for 
bank credit 
• Freedom to 
assess working 
capital limits 
• Minimum 
maturity of term 
deposit reduced to 
15 days 
• Flexibility to 
banks in deposit 
and lending 
activities 
(uniform rate for 
deposits removed, 
freedom to fix 
penalty for 
premature 
deposits, etc) 
  
• Tenor Linked 
PLR 
• Modification 
of norms 
relating to PLR 
• Fixed Rate 
Loans permitted 
• Flexibility to 
FIs to raise 
deposits/bonds 
 
• In deposit side 
ceiling on  
FCNRB 
reduced to 
LIBOR. 
• Flexibility to 
banks in 
offering 
interest rates 
on term 
deposits to 
senior citizens, 
on overdue 
deposits and on 
premature 
withdrawals. 
• Minimum 
maturity of 
term deposit 
reduced from 
15 to 7 days 
for deposits 
over Rs.15 
lakh. 
• On lending 
side, banks 
permitted to 
lend at sub-
PLR. 
  59
standards  • PLR emerges 
as benchmark 
rate.  
• Sub-PLR 
lending 
permitted 
 
• No capital 
adequacy 
requirements 
• Assets 
classified 
into 8 health 
codes and 
income 
recognition 
based on 
health code 
system. 
• Provisioning 
norms left to 
discretion of 
banks 
• Investments 
were at book 
value 
• Entry of 
foreign banks 
restrictive 
• BIS capital 
adequacy norms 
introduced 
• NPA defined 
• Asset 
classification in 
4 broad groups 
• Provisioning 
norms 
introduced 
• Investment 
valuation norms 
introduced 
• New private 
sector banks 
permitted 
• BFS in operation 
for 2 years 
• Exposure norms 
in force 
• Norms for 
Advances to 
shares by banks 
tightened 
• ALM for banks 
under discussion 
• Mark-to-market - 
Intention to move 
to 100% 
• Implementation 
of Narasimham 
Committee II 
• Increase in CAR 
from 8 to 9 % in 
phases 
• Provisioning for 
standard assets 
• Risk-weight for 
Govt Securities at 
2.5 % 
• Risk-weight for 
forex open 
positions at 100% 
• ALM for FIs 
under discussion 
• Bank exposure 
norms tightened 
 
• Mark to market 
for current 
investments 
increased to 75 
% 
• Limits on cross 
holdings of 
banks Tier-II 
capital 
• Risk weight for 
interest rate 
risk for non-
SLR bonds 
• Bank exposure 
norms 
tightened 
• New valuation 
norms for 
banks 
investment 
portfolio 
• Debate on UB 
• Intention to 
move to 
consolidated 
accounting 
• New capital 
adequacy 
framework of 
BIS reviewed 
• Additional 
capital in banks 
books for 
subsidiaries 
• Internal risk 
management 
systems in 
banks urged 
 
• Adoption of 
90-Day Norm 
for recognition 
of loan 
impairment 
from the year 
ending March 
31, 2004. 
• Adoption of 
180 day norm 
for recognition 
of loan 
impairment for 
FIs with effect 
from year 
ending March 
31, 2002. 
• Credit 
exposure 
norms based 
on 
international 
b t ti
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• No new 
foreign banks 
• Disclosure 
norms were 
poor 
best practices. 
• Group on Risk 
Based 
Supervision. 
• Group to look 
into 
introduction of 
consolidated 
accounting of 
banks. 
• Credit 
Information 
Bureau set up 
by banks 
• Discussion 
Paper on 
Prompt 
Corrective 
Action being 
finalized. 
• Prudential 
norms for 
cooperative 
banks 
strengthened 
• New 
regulatory 
structure for 
cooperative 
  61
banks 
proposed. 
* Most of the reforms in the financial sector were initiated in the period between 1992 and 1996. The period witnessed the introduction of capital 
adequacy requirements, prudential norms, exposure norms, etc. The period also saw a marked change in the environment governing financial 
markets. Reforms were undertaken towards instrument/institution development and improving the market microstructure. The period after 1996-
97 basically built upon the foundation laid during this period. 
